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JURISDICTION AND THE INTERNET: 
RETURNING TO TRADITIONAL 
PRINCIPLES TO ANALYZE 
NETWORK-MEDIATED CONTACTS† 
A. Benjamin Spencer* 
Courts have been evaluating the issue of personal jurisdiction 
based on Internet or “network-mediated” contacts for some time.  
The U.S. Supreme Court has remained silent on this issue, permitting 
the federal appeals courts to develop standards for determining when 
personal jurisdiction based on network-mediated contacts is appro-
priate.  Unfortunately, the circuit approaches—which emphasize a 
Web site’s “interactivity” and “target audience”—are flawed because 
they are premised on an outdated view of Internet activity as uncon-
trollably ubiquitous.  This view has led courts to depart from tradi-
tional jurisdictional analysis and impose elevated and misguided ju-
risdictional standards.  This article argues that courts should 
reinstitute traditional principles to analyze jurisdiction based on net-
work-mediated contacts in light of current technology that enables 
Internet actors to restrict the geographical reach of their virtual con-
duct.  Such a return will be fairer for plaintiffs while recognizing the 
legitimate due process rights of defendants. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you are surfing the Web in your home and you come 
across an article on the Web site of an out-of-state newspaper that makes 
numerous false statements about you, your views on race, and your work 
performance.  You are outraged and file a complaint in federal court in 
your state alleging defamation by the newspaper for the libelous remarks 
published on its Web site.  Your attorney has assured you that you can 
bring a suit against the newspaper in your state based on Calder v. Jones.1  
 
 †  © 2005 A. Benjamin Spencer.  All rights reserved. 
 *  Assistant Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law.  J.D., Harvard Law 
School, 2001; M.Sc., London School of Economics, 1997; B.A., Morehouse College, 1996.  The author 
would like to thank Carl Tobias, Kurt Meyers, Jim Gibson, Corrina Barrett Lain, Rod Smolla, Kim-
berly Jenkins, and Radha Pathak for reviewing this piece. 
 1. 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
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In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction in California 
over out-of-state journalists based on a defamatory article they wrote 
about a California resident that was published in the National Enquirer.2  
Although the district court agrees with your attorney, the federal appeals 
court surprisingly decides that jurisdiction is not appropriate because the 
intended audience for the Web site was readers in the state where the 
newspaper is physically located, not people in your state.3 
Welcome to the world of Internet-based jurisdiction, a realm in 
which courts have created new jurisdictional principles for analyzing con-
tacts mediated through cyberspace4 that depart from the traditional ju-
risdictional principles articulated in cases involving contacts made in real 
space.  In this world, new considerations such as a Web site’s “interactiv-
ity” and “target audience” are the essential concepts courts use to deter-
mine whether to treat virtual contacts as minimum contacts.  The courts 
believe that these new concepts, which seem to be more suited to the 
Internet, have supplanted traditional considerations.  However, this arti-
cle finds that courts have improperly altered traditional analysis in a way 
that results in an overly restrictive view of when virtual contacts may 
support jurisdiction. 
The Supreme Court has consolidated concerns about fairness and 
the limits of state sovereignty into a law of personal jurisdiction that re-
quires the defendant to have “minimum contacts” with the forum state.5  
These dual concerns6 have led the Court to require actions by the defen-
dant that purposefully affiliate the defendant with the forum before the 
Court has upheld assertions of jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants.7  
This requirement of “purposeful availment” has satisfied both concerns 
about fairness and about adhering to limits on state sovereignty.  It is fair 
to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant in a forum into which he pur-
posefully directs his actions,8 and state sovereignty empowers a state to 
adjudicate matters arising from conduct directed into its territory9 or in-
 
 2. Id. at 791. 
 3. See Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 258–59 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 4. Cyberspace simply is “a metaphor for describing the non-physical terrain created by com-
puter systems.”  Webopedia, Cyberspace, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/c/cyberspace.html (last 
visited Sept. 10, 2005).  In this article, cyberspace is used to refer to the nonphysical terrain created by 
online or networked computer systems.  See MIKE GODWIN, CYBER RIGHTS: DEFENDING FREE 
SPEECH IN THE DIGITAL AGE 5–6 (1998), for a good explanation of the series of “interconnected com-
puter forums” that comprise cyberspace. 
 5. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1980) (“The concept of 
minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform two related, but distinguishable, functions.  It pro-
tects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum.  And it acts to 
ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by 
their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.”). 
 6. The Court has also identified a third concern, individual liberty.  See Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 
Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (“The personal jurisdiction re-
quirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest.”). 
 7. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297–98. 
 8. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
 9. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984). 
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volving defendants substantially connected with,10 or present in,11 that 
state.12  Together with the requirement of purposeful availment, tradi-
tional specific personal jurisdiction analysis mandates that the cause of 
action arise out of the defendant’s purposeful contacts13 and that an as-
sertion of jurisdiction be constitutionally reasonable.14 
The advent and extensive use of the Internet have presented new 
challenges for the law of personal jurisdiction.  Many courts and scholars 
have grappled with how best to evaluate for constitutionality assertions 
of personal jurisdiction based on network-mediated contacts,15 reaching a 
wide range of conclusions about proper standards.16  The U.S. Supreme 
Court has thus far not entered this debate.17  Thus, appeals courts have 
 
 10. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) (“Even 
when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign corporation’s activities in the 
forum State, due process is not offended by a State’s subjecting the corporation to its in personam ju-
risdiction when there are sufficient contacts between the State and the foreign corporation.”); Perkins 
v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952) (finding that Ohio was permitted to exercise 
general jurisdiction over a company on the basis of its having “continuous and systematic” contacts 
with the state). 
 11. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (“The short of the matter is that juris-
diction based on physical presence alone constitutes due process because it is one of the continuing 
traditions of our legal system that define the due process standard of ‘traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice.’”); id. at 637 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“By visiting the forum State, a transient 
defendant actually ‘avail[s]’ himself of significant benefits provided by the State.” (alteration in origi-
nal) (citation omitted)). 
 12. Jurisdiction based on purposeful contacts with a state has come to be known as “specific ju-
risdiction,” Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8, while jurisdiction based on state residency, presence, or a 
substantial and continuous connection with a state is referred to as “general jurisdiction.”  Id. at 414 
n.9 (citations omitted). 
 13. This arising-out-of requirement is sometimes referred to as the “relatedness” or “nexus” re-
quirement. 
 14. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (permitting jurisdiction where 
purposeful availment, relatedness, and reasonableness are established). 
 15. I use “network-mediated contacts” (and at times “virtual contacts”) in this article as a term 
to refer to activity of any kind transmitted via a computer network or the Internet.  Such activity in-
cludes, for example, the posting of information to and publishing of Web sites, the use of e-mail or 
instant messaging, the use of chat rooms, newsgroups or other virtual forums, or the pushing or pulling 
of data onto or from computer networks or computers via such networks. 
 16. See, e.g., Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet 
Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345, 1380 (2001) (proposing a “targeting analysis” that would 
“seek to identify the intentions of the parties and to assess the steps taken to either enter or avoid a 
particular jurisdiction”); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Of Nodes and Power Laws: A Network Theory Ap-
proach to Internet Jurisdiction Through Data Privacy, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 493, 498 (2004) (proposing a 
“Trusted Systems” approach that uses notions of social responsibility and consent to determine the 
propriety of exercises of jurisdiction over behavior transmitted through technologically mediated 
communications networks such as the Internet); Martin H. Redish, Of New Wine and Old Bottles: Per-
sonal Jurisdiction, the Internet and the Nature of Constitutional Evolution, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 575, 605 
(1998) (recommending that the purposeful availment requirement be dispensed with in the Internet 
context); Carlos J. R. Salvado, An Effective Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine For The Internet, 12 U. 
BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 75, 78–80 (2003) (arguing for application of a hybrid Zippo and Calder 
analysis that permits jurisdiction only where effects of Internet activity are deliberately intensified with 
respect to a particular state). 
 17. See Gator.Com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003) (“No Supreme 
Court cases and only a handful of Ninth Circuit cases have addressed the issue of when and whether 
general jurisdiction may be asserted over a company that does business on the internet.”); ALS Scan 
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framed the standards for establishing personal jurisdiction on the basis of 
network-mediated contacts, with most developing or adopting a common 
approach.  Most courts have employed some variation of the sliding-scale 
framework developed in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, 
Inc.,18 and have incorporated a “targeting” or “express aiming” require-
ment seemingly inspired by the “effects” test the Supreme Court devel-
oped in Calder v. Jones.19 
Unfortunately, the prevailing analysis embodied in contemporary 
Zippo-based approaches is fundamentally unsound.  These approaches 
have increasingly led courts to resolve questions of jurisdiction in the 
Internet context in ways that diverge from the jurisdictional policy estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington20 
and its progeny.21  Thus, the modern standard permits the mere specter 
of an Internet connection to lead courts into erroneously forging new 
Internet-specific principles that unduly restrain legitimate exercises of 
jurisdiction. 
The prevailing approaches to evaluating Internet-based assertions 
of personal jurisdiction go beyond protecting the core concerns that un-
derlie the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence by reject-
ing jurisdiction when fairness to the defendant is not threatened and the 
limits of state sovereignty would not be breached.22  These approaches 
directly contravene jurisdictional precedent of the Supreme Court,23 most 
notably Calder v. Jones,24 which permits states to exercise jurisdiction 
when the defendants intentionally harm forum residents.25  Courts’ com-
mon practice of rejecting jurisdiction in cases involving intentional harms 
directed at forum residents through the Internet, notwithstanding the 
availability of the offending Web sites within the forum,26 violates Calder.  
 
Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 713 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that personal jurisdic-
tion analysis has yet to be “reconceived and rearticulated by the Supreme Court”). 
 18. 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (W.D. Pa. 1997); see, e.g., ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 714 (indicating that 
the court was “adopting and adapting the Zippo model”). 
 19. 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1984) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 
297–98 (1980)). 
 20. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (holding that if a defendant is not present within the forum state, 
jurisdiction may be exercised if the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such 
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice’” (citation omitted)). 
 21. E.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Calder, 465 U.S. at 783; World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286; 
Kulko v. Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 
357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
 22. See, e.g., Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002) (denying jurisdiction 
over nonresidents alleged to have intentionally defamed a forum resident). 
 23. E.g., Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472. 
 24. 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
 25. See id. at 788–90.  This standard has come to be referred to as the Calder “effects” test. 
 26. See, e.g., Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(denying jurisdiction over nonresidents alleged to have violated the trademark of a forum resident); 
Young, 315 F.3d at 258–60, 264 (denying jurisdiction over nonresidents alleged to have defamed a fo-
rum resident). 
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This undue restriction of personal jurisdiction in the Internet context ul-
timately results from courts’ decisions to discount the ubiquitous nature 
of Internet activity and their reluctance to embrace the consequences of 
the Internet’s omnipresence under traditional standards of personal ju-
risdiction.  Courts should return to an approach that honors traditional 
principles. 
Part II of this article reviews how federal courts have applied or 
adapted the law of personal jurisdiction in the Internet context.  It first 
focuses on the analysis developed by the Western District of Pennsyl-
vania in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.,27 which has 
gained broad acceptance among the regional circuits.  It then reviews 
how the appeals courts have evaluated personal jurisdiction based on 
network-mediated contacts, revealing a propensity to apply some form of 
the Zippo framework. 
Part III analyzes this body of Internet-jurisdiction jurisprudence, 
identifying several shortcomings.  First, the prevalent tests for evaluating 
jurisdiction based on network-mediated contacts wrongly presume that 
Internet activity is directed at no particular place simply because it is ac-
cessible globally.  Thus, courts have required additional indicia of state-
specific targeting before they permit a finding of purposeful availment.  
This stringent requirement is inappropriate given the ordinarily ubiqui-
tous nature of Internet activity.  Second, the prevalent approaches have 
overemphasized Web sites and their level of “interactivity.”  However, a 
Web site’s interactivity minimally implicates whether a defendant’s 
wrongful conduct is purposefully directed at a state in a manner that 
would support a finding of purposeful availment under traditional prin-
ciples.  More importantly, this irrelevant litmus test for Web sites has es-
sentially disqualified all Web sites that are deemed “passive” from sup-
porting personal jurisdiction, a result that is clearly extreme and 
inconsistent with what a traditional analysis would suggest.  Third, and 
finally, the Zippo-based tests undermine the Calder “effects” test by sup-
planting it with a new standard.  This new criterion replaces the critical 
factor in a Calder analysis—the target of wrongdoing—with a new factor:  
the overall target audience of Internet activity. 
Part IV proposes an alternative approach for evaluating jurisdiction 
based on network-mediated contacts in a manner that is more consistent 
with traditional personal jurisdiction analysis, arguing that application of 
traditional principles yields greater fairness to plaintiffs without sacrific-
ing the legitimate due process concerns of defendants.  Because it is now 
technologically possible to restrict the accessibility of Internet material to 
specific geographical areas, applying a traditional analysis to non-
geographically restricted Internet activity yields a presumption that those 
Internet actors purposefully avail themselves of every jurisdiction they 
 
 27. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
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permit their virtual conduct to reach.  However, the widespread fear 
shared by many courts and commentators that this application of unal-
tered traditional jurisdictional principles will result in universal jurisdic-
tion over Internet actors is unfounded.  Universal jurisdiction will hardly 
be the inevitable outcome of applying traditional principles, given the 
ability of defendants to avoid the presumption of purposeful availment 
by employing geographical restriction techniques and the role that the 
“arising-out-of” and “reasonableness” requirements of the analysis can 
play in limiting unwarranted assertions of jurisdiction. 
II. CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND 
THE INTERNET 
Much has already been written about how the courts initially ap-
plied jurisdictional principles to the Internet.28  However, a brief review 
of initial judicial treatment of this issue will contextualize the current ap-
proaches of the regional circuits. 
A. Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc. 
The path not taken, as it were, is represented by the “early” case of 
Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.29  Inset involved a trademark in-
fringement claim brought in Connecticut by Inset Systems (Inset), a 
Connecticut corporation, against Instruction Set, Inc. (ISI), a Massachu-
setts corporation, arising out of ISI’s registration of “INSET.COM” as its 
Internet domain address.30  Inset had previously registered “INSET” as a 
federal trademark and learned about ISI’s use of its trademark in its do-
main address when Inset itself sought to register for the “INSET.COM” 
domain address.31  ISI moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction, arguing that it did not conduct business in Connecticut 
on a regular basis.32  Inset responded that jurisdiction was appropriate 
because “the defendant has used the Internet, as well as its toll-free 
number to try to conduct business within the state of Connecticut.”33 
Analogizing ISI’s use of the Internet to the use of product catalogs 
to solicit orders from potential customers, the court in Inset found that 
ISI, by using the Internet and a toll-free telephone number, directed its 
 
 28. See, for example, Redish, supra note 16, for a discussion of the evolution of judicial ap-
proaches to this issue. 
 29. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996). 
 30. Id. at 162–63.  Domain addresses are also referred to as “domain names.”  A domain name is 
“any alphanumeric designation which is registered with or assigned by any domain name registrar, 
domain name registry, or other domain name registration authority as part of an electronic address on 
the Internet.”  15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). 
 31. Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 162–63.  ISI was also discovered to be “us[ing] the telephone number 
‘1-800-US-INSET’ to . . . advertise its goods and services.”  Id. at 163. 
 32. Id. at 164. 
 33. Id. 
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advertising activity toward Connecticut and all states.34  The court 
reached this conclusion because “[t]he Internet as well as toll-free num-
bers are designed to communicate with people and their businesses in 
every state.”35  As a result, the court had no difficulty concluding, “ISI 
has therefore, purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing busi-
ness within Connecticut.”36  The court also concluded that jurisdiction 
would be consistent with “fair play and substantial justice” because Con-
necticut had an interest in adjudicating the dispute and the minimal dis-
tance between Massachusetts and Connecticut would minimize any in-
convenience to the defendant.37 
The Inset case received much criticism for its broad holding that 
publishing a Web site on the Internet would permit a finding of purpose-
ful availment wherever the Web site was accessible.38  Many critics ar-
gued that supporting such a conclusion would virtually eviscerate any 
limitations on state court jurisdiction, undermining the notion articulated 
in numerous Supreme Court cases that the Due Process Clause limits the 
territorial reach of states.39  This view is a slight overreaction, because 
finding that purposeful availment exists wherever a Web site is made 
available is not necessarily finding that personal jurisdiction is proper; 
under traditional jurisdictional analysis, the court must still determine 
that the claim arises from the Web contact and that the assertion of juris-
diction is constitutionally reasonable.  Other critics suggested that it was 
inappropriate to presume a global targeting of activity merely because 
the Internet was accessible globally; rather, courts should examine which 
geographical areas the defendant actually intended to target with its 
Internet activities.40 
 
 34. Id. at 165. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Jurisdiction in a World Without Borders, 1 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, 53 
(1997) (stating, in disapproving of Inset, “[A]s of this writing, there are estimated to be approximately 
half a million Web sites on the Internet; if one were to adopt the reasoning of the Inset Systems opin-
ion, all half a million Web site operators have ‘purposefully availed’ themselves of the privilege of do-
ing business in Connecticut—even if they have never heard of Connecticut.”); Geist, supra note 16, at 
1362 (“The [Inset] court’s decision was problematic for several reasons.”); Redish, supra note 16, at 
589 (indicating, in speaking about Inset’s approach, that “such a mode of analysis is seriously flawed”).  
But see Matwyshyn, supra note 16, at 507 (“Although the rationale proffered by the court in Inset was 
flawed in some respects, . . . summarily disregarding Inset’s analysis is unwarranted and, perhaps, in-
adequately contemplative of the types of harms that arise from contacts involving Web sites.  The out-
come in Inset, based on a different rationale grounded in a minimum contacts analysis, may have been 
appropriate.”). 
 39. See, e.g., Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620 (PKL)(AJP), 1997 WL 97097, at *16 
(S.D.N.Y.  Feb. 27, 1997) (“Because the Web enables easy world-wide access, allowing computer in-
teraction via the Web to supply sufficient contacts to establish jurisdiction would eviscerate the per-
sonal jurisdiction requirement as it currently exists . . . .” (quoting McDonough v. Fallon McElligot, 
Inc., No. 95-4037, 1996 WL 753991, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 1996))); see also Geist, supra note 16, at 
1362. 
 40. See, e.g., Geist, supra note 16, at 1362. 
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Despite Inset’s perceived shortcomings, it offered a certain simplic-
ity and coherence as an alternative to the muddled confusion that had 
become personal jurisdiction law in the wake of International Shoe and 
its progeny.41  Rather than creating yet another “test,” the court reached 
the sound conclusion that Web-based advertising presumptively targeted 
all potential users of the Web in every state, and indeed across the globe.  
After all, the Web site in Inset was located on the “World Wide Web,” a 
moniker that expressly announces the medium’s global reach.  The sug-
gestion that one who places information on something called the World 
Wide Web can at least be presumed to intend that the information be ac-
cessible by everyone in the world with Internet access is rational.  Cer-
tainly those commercial Internet actors who would welcome business 
from any state in the United States arising out of their Web presence 
could be said to be availing themselves of the national market.42  Thus, 
the Inset decision does not deserve all of the criticism that it has received. 
B. Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. 
Fortunately for Inset’s detractors, a different federal district court 
soon articulated a competing approach for determining whether jurisdic-
tion is appropriate based on an Internet presence.  In Zippo Manufactur-
ing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.,43 the court heard an Internet domain 
name dispute couched in terms of an action alleging trademark infringe-
ment,44 as was the case in Inset.  Zippo Manufacturing (Manufacturing) 
was a Pennsylvania corporation that brought suit in a federal district 
court in Pennsylvania against Zippo Dot Com (Dot Com), a California 
corporation.45  Dot Com operated a Web site and Internet news service46 
and had secured the exclusive right to use the domain names 
“zippo.com,” “zippo.net,” and “zipponews.com” on the Internet.47  
Manufacturing, the owner of the “Zippo” trademark, based its claims of 
infringement on Dot Com’s use of the trademark in its domain names, in 
numerous locations on its Web site, and in the heading of newsgroup48 
 
 41. See, e.g., Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts: Toward A Mixed The-
ory of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J. 189, 189 (1998) (“Ambiguity and incoherence have plagued 
the minimum contacts test for the more than five decades during which it has served as a cornerstone 
of the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction doctrine.”). 
 42. As one court put it when referring to a business that posted advertising information on the 
Internet, if a forum resident had called the business in response to seeing the advertisement on the 
Web site, “Defendants would not have refused the call.”  TELCO Commc’ns v. An Apple A Day, 977 
F. Supp. 404, 406 (E.D. Va. 1997). 
 43. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
 44. Id. at 1120–21. 
 45. Id. at 1121. 
 46. Dot Com’s news service is a membership/subscriber service where subscribers can view or 
download newsgroup messages that are stored on Dot Com’s server in California.  Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Newsgroups are on-line discussion groups or forums within USENET that contain discus-
sions on specified topics; users post messages to a news server at which point other users can then read 
the postings.  Sharpened.net, Newsgroup, http://www.sharpened.net/glossary/definition.php? 
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messages posted by subscribers to Dot Com’s newsgroup.49  Dot Com 
moved to dismiss the Pennsylvania action, arguing that its Web site, 
which was accessible to Pennsylvania residents via the Internet, was an 
insufficient basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction.50 
Rather than take the approach of the Inset court that the Pennsyl-
vania Web presence alone sufficed to create the requisite minimum con-
tacts between Dot Com and Pennsylvania, and rather than applying 
purely traditional principles to the question, the Zippo court crafted a 
completely new approach.  The heart of the Zippo court’s approach is its 
“sliding scale,” which provides that the constitutionality of an assertion 
of personal jurisdiction “is directly proportionate to the nature and qual-
ity of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet.”51  
The court elaborated on its approach with the following (now famous) 
passage: 
At one end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly 
does business over the Internet.  If the defendant enters into con-
tracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the know-
ing and repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet, 
personal jurisdiction is proper.  At the opposite end are situations 
where a defendant has simply posted information on an Internet 
Web site which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions.  A pas-
sive Web site that does little more than make information available 
to those who are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise [of] 
personal jurisdiction.  The middle ground is occupied by interactive 
Web sites where a user can exchange information with the host 
computer.  In these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined 
by examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the 
exchange of information that occurs on the Web site.52 
The categories of cases outlined in the above-quoted passage have come 
to be characterized as active (when the defendant clearly does business 
over the Internet), passive (the purely informational sites), and interac-
tive (sites permitting the exchange of information).53 
 
newsgroup (last visited Sept. 19, 2005).  To post to or read postings from a newsgroup, a user must 
subscribe to the group.  Id.  USENET is defined as “[a] worldwide bulletin board system that can be 
accessed through the Internet or through many online services.”  Webopedia, Usenet, 
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/U/Usenet.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2005).  USENET predates the 
Web but is now incorporated into it as one of the supported protocols.  See Faqs.com, What is 
USENET? How is it different than “the Web”?, http://www.faqs.org/faqs/judaism/FAQ/01-FAQ-
intro/section-2.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2005). 
 49. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1121. 
 50. See id. at 1112–27. 
 51. Id. at 1124. 
 52. Id. (citations omitted). 
 53. Heidle v. Prospect Resort, Ltd., 364 F. Supp. 2d 312, 318 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Zippo, 952 
F. Supp. at 1119).  As one commentator aptly noted, as more Web sites employ data collection tech-
nologies to collect information on visitors of those sites, “websites that a user perceives to be simply 
‘dead advertising’ or content that is not collecting significant amounts of information and thus deemed 
to be relatively ‘passive’ under the sliding scale approach may, in fact, be still highly interactive in real 
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Applying this newly minted test, the court found Dot Com’s site to 
be highly active.54  Because the facts showed that Dot Com, through its 
Web site, had contracted with roughly 3000 individuals and seven Inter-
net access providers in Pennsylvania, transactions that aimed to facilitate 
the downloading of material in Pennsylvania, the court concluded that 
Dot Com was purposefully availing itself of the privilege of doing busi-
ness in Pennsylvania.55  By “repeatedly and consciously cho[osing] to 
process Pennsylvania residents’ applications and to assign them pass-
words,” the court concluded that Dot Com freely chose to sell its services 
to Pennsylvania residents, “presumably in order to profit from those 
transactions.”56  After finding the assertion of jurisdiction over Dot Com 
to be reasonable,57 the court denied Dot Com’s motion to dismiss.58 
C. Circuits Applying a Zippo-Based Test 
Courts immediately exalted the Zippo case to the status of an in-
stant classic.59  Seemingly relieved that a court had offered an apparently 
sensible and workable approach for tackling jurisdictional questions in 
the new medium of the Internet that did not simply abdicate all jurisdic-
tional analysis as the Inset court was seen to have done, courts rushed to 
adopt and apply the Zippo framework as the standard for determining 
personal jurisdiction in cyberspace.60  Many federal appeals courts have 
embraced the Zippo test.  The Ninth Circuit was one of the first circuit 
courts to address the issue of personal jurisdiction based on network-
mediated contacts in Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.61  In Cybersell, the 
Ninth Circuit indicated that Web sites that simply advertise or solicit 
sales could not support an assertion of personal jurisdiction without 
“‘something more’ to indicate that the defendant purposefully (albeit 
 
terms because of the extent of data collection being conducted in relation to the user.”  Matwyshyn, 
supra note 16, at 513 (citation omitted). 
 54. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1125 (“This is a ‘doing business over the Internet’ case. . . .”). 
 55. Id. at 1121–26. 
 56. Id. at 1126. 
 57. Id. at 1127. 
 58. Id. at 1128. 
 59. See, e.g., Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 452 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The opinion 
in Zippo . . . has become a seminal authority regarding personal jurisdiction based upon the operation 
of an Internet web site.”); Shamsuddin v. Vitamin Research Prods., 346 F. Supp. 2d 804, 809 (D. Md. 
2004) (“Zippo has proved to be a watershed case. . . .”). 
 60. See, e.g., Patriot Sys., Inc. v. C-Cubed Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1324 (D. Utah 1998) (“The 
court finds [Zippo’s] analysis helpful in this relatively new and changing area of law. . . .”); Thompson 
v. Handa-Lopez, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 738, 742 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (“[Zippo’s] sliding scale is consistent 
with well developed personal jurisdiction principles.”); Mieczkowski v. Masco Corp., 997 F. Supp. 782, 
786–87 (E.D. Tex. 1998) (“After reviewing the cases relating to this issue, the Court agrees with the 
proposition that ‘the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly 
proportionate to the nature and quality of the commercial activity that an entity conducts over the 
Internet.’” (quoting Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124)); SF Hotel Co., L.P. v. Energy Invs., Inc., 985 F. 
Supp. 1032, 1034–35 (D. Kan. 1997) (applying the Zippo standard); Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 
327, 333 (D.N.J. 1997) (applying the tripartite Zippo framework). 
 61. 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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electronically) directed his activity in a substantial way to the forum 
state.”62  Because the defendant’s Web site in Cybersell was “an essen-
tially passive home page,” the court concluded, “[W]e cannot see how 
from that fact alone it can be inferred that [the defendant] deliberately 
directed its merchandising efforts toward [forum] residents.”63  Thus, the 
Ninth Circuit indicated that for a Web site to serve as the basis for per-
sonal jurisdiction, it would have to be specifically targeted at the forum 
state.64  The rationale for such a limitation was made clear:  if a passive 
Web site that contained infringing material could, without more, satisfy 
the purposeful availment requirement of the specific jurisdiction test, 
“every complaint arising out of alleged trademark infringement on the 
Internet would automatically result in personal jurisdiction wherever the 
plaintiff’s principal place of business is located.”65 
Today, most circuits have adapted the Zippo test by infusing it with 
some requirement of intentional and forum-specific “targeting” or “ex-
press aiming” as the “something more” demanded by the Cybersell court.  
The Fourth Circuit adopted such an approach in ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digi-
tal Service Consultants, Inc.,66 requiring that a Web site be directed at the 
forum and also mandating a specific intent to engage in business or other 
interactions within the forum state.67  Based on its commitment to main-
tain limits on the reach of state jurisdiction in the face of social and tech-
nological change,68 the court in ALS Scan indicated that it was compelled 
to adapt traditional jurisdictional principles for the purposes of analyzing 
Internet-based contacts “because the Internet is omnipresent.”69  Such an 
adaptation was necessary, the court suggested, because otherwise, under 
traditional principles, “[t]he person placing information on the Internet 
would be subject to personal jurisdiction in every State.”70  This outcome 
was unacceptable to the court because “then the defense of personal ju-
risdiction, in the sense that a State has geographically limited judicial 
power, would no longer exist.”71 
Because it was unwilling to accept what it perceived would be the 
outcome of applying traditional principles to network-mediated con-
tacts—universal jurisdiction—the ALS Scan court determined that it had 
to develop “the more limited circumstances when it can be deemed that 
 
 62. Id. at 418. 
 63. Id. at 419. 
 64. Id. at 419–20. 
 65. Id. at 420. 
 66. 293 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 67. Id. at 714. 
 68. Id. at 711.  The court took this charge from Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), where 
the Supreme Court stated that the “technological progress” that had “increased the flow of commerce 
between States” should not be viewed as a trend that “heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions 
on the personal jurisdiction of state courts.”  Id. at 250–51. 
 69. ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 712. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
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an out-of-state citizen, through electronic contacts, has conceptually ‘en-
tered’ the State via the Internet for jurisdictional purposes.”72  Standing 
on the core requirement of specific jurisdiction that there must be pur-
poseful conduct of the defendant directed at a state that gives rise to the 
plaintiff’s claims, the court decided to “adopt[] and adapt[] the Zippo 
model”73 and created the following standard: 
[A] State may, consistent with due process, exercise judicial power 
over a person outside of the State when that person (1) directs elec-
tronic activity into the State, (2) with the manifested intent of en-
gaging in business or other interactions within the State, and (3) 
that activity creates, in a person within the State, a potential cause 
of action cognizable in the State’s courts.74 
In elaborating on this standard, the court indicated that “passive” Inter-
net activity would not subject the actor to jurisdiction in each State 
where the electronic signal is transmitted and received.75  Rather, the 
court explained, “specific jurisdiction in the Internet context may be 
based only on an out-of-state person’s Internet activity directed at [a 
state] and causing injury that gives rise to a potential claim cognizable in 
[that state].”76 
The Third Circuit—out of which the district court opinion in Zippo 
originates—announced a similar approach to evaluating jurisdiction 
based on network-mediated contacts in Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, 
S.A.,77 concluding that a commercial Web site must target the forum state 
or knowingly interact with forum residents to support personal jurisdic-
tion.78  The case involved a trademark, unfair competition, and cyber-
squatting79 dispute between Toys “R” Us, Inc., a Delaware corporation 
based in New Jersey, and Step Two, S.A., a Spanish corporation, over 
Step Two’s use of the mark “Imaginarium” in two of its Web sites.80  
These Web sites were commercial in nature in that they advertised prod-
ucts (educational toys) and allowed consumers to purchase the products 
through the Web site.81  However, the Web sites were entirely in Spanish, 
prices were listed exclusively in pesetas and Euros, and goods ordered 
from the site could only be shipped within Spain, with U.S. addresses not 
 
 72. Id. at 713. 
 73. Id. at 713–14. 
 74. Id. at 714. 
 75. See id. 
 76. Id. at 714. 
 77. 318 F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 78. Id. at 454. 
 79. “Cybersquatting means registering, selling or using a domain name with the intent of profit-
ing from the goodwill of someone else’s trademark.  It generally refers to the practice of buying up 
domain names that use the names of existing businesses with the intent to sell the names for a profit to 
those businesses.”  Nolo.com, Cybersquatting: What It Is and What Can Be Done About It, http:// 
www.nolo.com/article.cfm/objectID/60EC3491-B4B5-4A98-BB6E6632A2FA0CB2/111/228/195/ART 
(last visited Jan. 21, 2005). 
 80. Toys “R” Us, 318 F.3d at 448. 
 81. Id. at 450. 
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being accommodated in the online form.82  Toys “R” Us brought suit in 
New Jersey federal court and Step Two challenged personal jurisdiction. 
On appeal from a judgment denying personal jurisdiction over Step 
Two, the Third Circuit first discussed Zippo and indicated that courts 
within the Third Circuit had since “made explicit the requirement that 
the defendant intentionally interact with the forum state via the web site 
in order to show purposeful availment”83 and “have repeatedly recog-
nized that there must be ‘something more’ . . . to demonstrate that the 
defendant directed its activity towards the forum state.”84  After review-
ing these lower court decisions and consulting the opinions of other cir-
cuits,85 the Third Circuit concluded, 
[T]he mere operation of a commercially interactive web site should 
not subject the operator to jurisdiction anywhere in the world.  
Rather, there must be evidence that the defendant “purposefully 
availed” itself of conducting activity in the forum state, by directly 
targeting its web site to the state, knowingly interacting with resi-
dents of the forum state via its web site, or through sufficient other 
related contacts.86 
This approach is similar to the Fourth Circuit’s test in its references to 
targeting the forum and interaction with state residents.  However, the 
standard is easier to satisfy than the Fourth Circuit test because the Third 
Circuit posits its factors as alternative rather than cumulative require-
ments; that is, purposeful availment may be found either where the Web 
site targets the forum or if the defendant knowingly interacts with resi-
dents of the forum state.  The Fourth Circuit requires both the targeting 
of the Web site at the forum and at least a specific intent to interact with 
forum residents.87  Having articulated its approach, the Third Circuit eas-
ily concluded that the facts before it could not support a finding of per-
sonal jurisdiction over Step Two.88  Courts in the Fifth,89 Sixth,90 and Sev-
 
 82. Id.  Visitors to the site could also become a member of “Club Imaginarium” upon providing 
an email address.  Club Imaginarium was “a promotional club with games and information for chil-
dren.”  Id. 
 83. Id. at 452 (citing S. Morantz, Inc. v. Hang & Shine Ultrasonics, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 537, 540 
(E.D. Pa. 1999)). 
 84. Id. (quoting Desktop Techs., Inc. v. Colorworks Reprod. & Design, No. CIV. A. 98-5029, 
1999 WL 98572, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 1999)) (emphasis omitted). 
 85. The court considered the standards articulated in ALS Scan v. Digital Service Consultants, 
Inc., 293 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2002), Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 890 (6th Cir. 
2002), and Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 86. Toys “R” Us, 318 F.3d at 454 (emphasis added). 
 87. ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 714. 
 88. Toys “R” US, 318 F.3d at 454.  The critical factors supporting the court’s decision that Step 
Two had not targeted New Jersey were the fact that Step Two’s web sites were entirely in Spanish, the 
prices for its merchandise were listed in pesetas or Euros, and the fact that merchandise could be 
shipped only to addresses within Spain, with none of the portions of Step Two’s web sites being capa-
ble of accommodating addresses within the United States.  Id.  The court also found no evidence of 
knowing interaction with forum residents or any other related contacts.  Id. 
 89. The Fifth Circuit requires express aiming of Internet activity at the forum state in particular 
before such activity can support personal jurisdiction.  In Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002), 
the Fifth Circuit determined that an allegedly defamatory post to an Internet bulletin board had to be 
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enth91 Circuits have adopted approaches similar to those of the Third and 
Fourth Circuits. 
The Eighth, Tenth, D.C., and Federal Circuits have all addressed 
the issue in some way, but less fully.  The Eighth Circuit has yet to ana-
lyze an assertion of specific jurisdiction based on a Web site.  However, 
in Lakin v. Prudential Securities, Inc.,92 a general jurisdiction case, the 
court remarked, “We agree with our sister circuits that the Zippo model 
is an appropriate approach in cases of specific jurisdiction.”93  Because 
the Eighth Circuit has not provided any further interpretation of Zippo, 
lower courts within the Eighth Circuit have had to apply their own view 
of the Zippo test.94  A similar situation obtains in the Tenth Circuit, 
which has minimally addressed this issue.  Although it clearly stated in an 
early case that, based on the Zippo framework, a “passive” informational 
Web site could not constitute purposeful availment such that would sup-
port an assertion of personal jurisdiction,95 lower courts in the Tenth Cir-
cuit have had to fill in the gaps, with one district court reaching the same 
conclusion that other circuits have reached:  “Courts require something 
more that indicates the defendant purposefully directed its activities in a 
substantial way toward the forum state to find personal jurisdiction.”96 
 
specifically targeted at the forum, the state of Texas.  Id. at 475 (“[A]pplication of Calder in the Inter-
net context requires proof that the out-of-state defendant’s Internet activity is expressly directed at or 
directed to the forum state.” (quoting Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 262 (4th Cir. 
2002))). 
 90. When evaluating assertions of jurisdiction based on network-mediated contacts, the Sixth 
Circuit evaluates the degree of interactivity of a Web site and whether it “reveals specifically intended 
interaction with residents of the state.”  Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 890 
(6th Cir. 2002) (citing Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 
1997)).  Thus, without a sufficient level of “specifically intended” interactivity with forum residents, 
the Sixth Circuit views a Web site alone as merely an “‘attenuated’ contact that falls short of purpose-
ful availment.”  Id. 
 91. In Jennings v. AC Hydraulic A/S, 383 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2004), the Seventh Circuit wrote, 
“The exercise of personal jurisdiction based on the maintenance of a passive website is impermissible 
because the defendant is not directing its business activities toward consumers in the forum state in 
particular.”  Id. at 549–50 (emphasis added). 
 92. 348 F.3d 704 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 93. Id. at 711. 
 94. One court that faced this issue recently used the Zippo test only to conclude that the Web 
site at issue was interactive, but then referred to the Calder “effects test” to determine whether juris-
diction was appropriate.  See Zidon v. Pickrell, 344 F. Supp. 2d 624, 630–31 (D.N.D. 2004).  In doing 
so, the Zidon court required the same deliberate and specific targeting of the Web site at the forum in 
the name of Calder that other courts have come to require without expressly invoking that case.  See 
id. at 631 (“The record reveals that Pickrell deliberately and knowingly directed the Web site, e-mail, 
and Internet comments at the State of North Dakota because North Dakota is Zidon’s residence.”). 
 95. Soma Med. Int’l v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1299 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 96. Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Genfoot Inc., No. 02-4160-JAR, 2004 WL 2182184, at *3 (D. Kan. 
Sept. 21, 2004).  As a different district court within the Tenth Circuit stated it, slightly more strongly, 
“a proper analysis of the jurisdictional effects of an internet web site must look beyond the degree of 
interactivity provided by the web site and instead focus on whether the defendant has actually and 
deliberately used its web site to conduct commercial transactions or other activities with residents of 
the forum.”  Fairbrother v. Am. Monument Found., LLC, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1156 (D. Colo. 2004) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The D.C. Circuit has addressed the issue on two occasions but has 
not expounded in great detail its approach to analyzing jurisdiction in the 
Internet context.  Although initially cautioning against permitting Web 
sites to establish minimum contacts within the forum for fear of promot-
ing universal jurisdiction,97 the D.C. Circuit more recently stated that 
where a defendant’s Web site is highly interactive, enabling “District 
residents [to] use its website to engage in electronic transactions with the 
firm . . . 24 hours a day,”98 such contacts could be considered “continuous 
and systematic” to such a degree that the defendant could be considered 
“doing business” in the forum.99 
Finally, the Federal Circuit in Maynard v. Philadelphia Cervical 
Collar Co.100 held, “A passive website is insufficient to establish purpose-
ful availment for the purpose of due process.”101  The Federal Circuit 
suggested that beyond the maintenance of a Web site, defendants must 
have “performed additional acts to purposefully avail themselves of the 
forum state” to establish jurisdiction.102 
D. Circuits Yet to Adopt an Approach 
The First Circuit has yet to address the issue of personal jurisdiction 
based solely on network-mediated contacts and has had no occasion to 
cite to the Zippo case.103  District courts within the First Circuit, however, 
have addressed the issue, adopting the Zippo sliding-scale framework.104  
A recent opinion of a magistrate judge in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Maine combined the use of the sliding-scale framework with 
the “target audience” reasoning used by most circuits to deny jurisdiction 
in Maine based on a Web site viewable in Maine that allegedly defamed 
Maine residents.105  Jurisdiction was denied because the Web site itself 
 
 97. GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“This 
theory simply cannot hold water.  Indeed, under this view, personal jurisdiction in Internet-related 
cases would almost always be found in any forum in the country.  We do not believe that the advent of 
advanced technology, say, as with the Internet, should vitiate long-held and inviolate principles of fed-
eral court jurisdiction.”). 
 98. Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 512 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 99. Id. at 513. 
 100. 18 F. App’x 814 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 101. Id. at 816. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See Venture Tape Corp. v. McGills Glass Warehouse, 292 F. Supp. 2d 230, 232 (D. Mass. 
2003) (“The First Circuit has not addressed the question whether an interactive website, located out-
side Massachusetts and directed at Massachusetts residents only in the sense that it is directed at resi-
dents of every state, may on its own fulfill the requirement of purposeful availment.”); Swarovski Op-
tik N.A. Ltd. v. Euro Optics, Inc., C.A. No. 03-090ML, 2003 WL 22014581, at *4 (D.R.I. Aug. 25, 
2003) (“[N]either the First Circuit nor this District Court have examined the exact contours of per-
sonal jurisdiction based upon the existence of a web site, particularly when the defendant has no other 
contacts with the forum state.”). 
 104. See, e.g., Comer v. Comer, 295 F. Supp. 2d 201, 209–10 (D. Mass. 2003) (declining to exercise 
jurisdiction on the basis of a “passive” Web site). 
 105. Gentle Wind Project v. Garvey, No. 04-103-P-C, 2005 WL 40064, at *6–9 (D. Me. Jan. 10, 
2005). 
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did not target Maine specifically:  “Nothing offered by the plaintiffs in 
this case allows the drawing of a reasonable inference that Ross designed 
the web site at issue ‘to attract or serve a [Maine] audience.’”106 
The Second Circuit addressed the issue in Bensusan Restaurant 
Corp. v. King107—a pre-Zippo case—but declined to exercise jurisdiction 
based on the defendant’s Web site solely because that connection failed 
to satisfy New York’s long-arm statute.108  However, in so doing, the Sec-
ond Circuit did conclude that the Missouri defendant’s passive informa-
tional Web site could not support a finding that the defendant had com-
mitted a tortious act in the forum, New York.109 
Finally, although the Eleventh Circuit appears not to have ad-
dressed this issue, courts within the Eleventh Circuit are relying upon the 
Zippo approach to evaluate assertions of personal jurisdiction based on 
network-mediated contacts.  For example, in Barton Southern Company, 
Inc. v. Manhole Barrier Systems, Inc.,110 the court used the Zippo sliding 
scale to determine that the Web site at issue was interactive and pro-
ceeded to evaluate “the level of interactivity and commercial nature of 
the exchange of information” per Zippo.111  In conducting that analysis, 
the court concluded that the Web site was insufficiently interactive be-
cause “it does not allow customers to make payments or complete or-
ders.”112  The court further found that “[t]here is nothing on the website 
showing an intent to reach out to persons living in Georgia, and there is 
no evidence that any Georgia residents have done business with MBS, 
either through the Internet or otherwise.”113  These comments suggest an 
affinity for the position espoused by those circuits requiring intended, 
specific, and actual interaction with forum residents; however, the Elev-
enth Circuit itself has yet to specify what standards should apply. 
III. A CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY ANALYSES 
Having surveyed the relevant circuit court opinions, a consensus 
emerges:  for a Web site to support the claim, courts require it to be (1) 
interactive and (2) intentionally and specifically targeted at an audience 
within the forum.  Some courts additionally or alternatively require the 
Web site to (3) have a history of actual interaction with forum residents 
to support a finding of purposeful availment.  Three preliminary observa-
 
 106. Id. at *8. 
 107. 126 F.3d 25, 27–29 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 108. See id. at 29.  The Second Circuit recently faced the question of whether jurisdiction could be 
based on the presence of a Web site, but again decided the case on the basis of the failure to satisfy the 
terms of New York’s long-arm statute.  See Girl Scouts of the United States of America v. Michael 
Steir, 102 F. App’x 217, 219–21 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 109. See Bensusan, 126 F.3d at 29. 
 110. 318 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (N.D. Ga. 2004). 
 111. Id. at 1177. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
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tions are warranted here.  First, the circuits have developed this ap-
proach to jurisdiction based on network-mediated contacts mainly in the 
context of considering commercial Web sites, but have generalized its 
application to Web sites of any kind.  Second, the consensus approach 
largely discounts passive Web sites as insufficient for jurisdictional pur-
poses—a position in keeping with the original vision of Zippo.114  Third, 
courts are requiring state-specific targeting in light of the fact that Inter-
net activity ordinarily (but not always or inevitably) results in a ubiquity 
that defies geographical boundaries; that is, because Internet activity 
goes everywhere, the courts have created a presumption that the activity 
is targeted nowhere, a presumption I will refer to as the presumption of 
aimlessness. 
These observations reveal three principal difficulties with the pre-
vailing Zippo-inspired approaches to analyzing Internet contacts.  First, 
the presumption that Internet activity targets no particular place because 
it is broadcast everywhere indiscriminately is little more than a conven-
ient fiction that has enabled courts to negate the very ubiquity that de-
fines the Internet and leads businesses and individuals to avail them-
selves of the medium.  However, that fiction is inconsistent with the 
reality of Internet activity:  absent the employment of restrictive meas-
ures that can limit the accessibility of Web sites to certain geographical 
areas or users,115 those who post information on the Internet—by placing 
material on a globally accessible medium—arguably direct that material 
at all potential users of the Internet, wherever they may be found. 
Second, it is unclear what relevance the degree of interactivity (or 
lack thereof) of a Web site has to traditional personal jurisdiction analy-
sis.  This is particularly true, given that such a consideration bears no 
necessary relation to whether the conduct at issue—which could consist 
of commercial activity, defamatory statements, or the misuse of intellec-
tual property—constitutes purposeful availment.  Thus, refusing to per-
mit so-called passive Web sites to support jurisdiction unduly limits the 
jurisdictional reach of states regardless of whether the site would satisfy 
the Supreme Court’s established jurisdictional standards. 
Third, and finally, in the intentional tort context—which principally 
includes defamation but can also include tort-like intellectual property 
claims116—the focus of the prevailing Zippo-based approaches on the fo-
rum targeting of Web sites, rather than on the targeting of the tortious 
conduct manifested within the Web sites, distracts courts from a proper 
application of the Calder “effects” test in the Internet context.  As a re-
sult, courts senselessly concern themselves, for example, with whether 
 
 114. The Tenth and Fourth Circuits appear to place more weight on specific-forum targeting than 
the passive-versus-interactive profile of the Web site. 
 115. See infra text accompanying notes 136–46. 
 116. See, e.g., Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1998) (indicating 
that trademark infringement is “akin to a tort case” and thus warrants application of the Calder “ef-
fects” test). 
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Web-based activity “target[s] Marylanders”117 or is “about Texas”118 
rather than whether the alleged tort has targeted and harmed the plain-
tiff in a manner the Calder “effects” test deems relevant.  Each of these 
deficiencies will be discussed in turn. 
A. The Presumption of Aimlessness 
A primary flaw of the prevailing approach is its rejection of the 
ubiquitous nature of Internet activity in favor of a fictitious presumption 
that Internet activity is targeted nowhere.  Two undercurrents of thought 
have led courts to adopt this view.  First, many courts espousing Zippo-
based approaches have indicated concern that embracing Internet activ-
ity’s omnipresence would eliminate all limits on personal jurisdiction.  
For example, when faced with the prospect that Internet activity might 
supply the basis for minimum contacts with a state, the Fourth Circuit 
replied, “[I]f that broad interpretation of minimum contacts were 
adopted, State jurisdiction over persons would be universal, and notions 
of limited State sovereignty and personal jurisdiction would be eviscer-
ated.”119  Such a posture of fear toward the Internet is consistent with the 
view of many who see the Internet as a pernicious force in our society.120  
However, such fears are unwarranted.  As discussed below,121 accepting 
the Internet’s ubiquity need only create a rebuttable presumption that 
Internet activity is directed at every state for purposes of purposeful 
availment, a presumption that defendants can overcome by demonstrat-
ing that they took specific steps to limit the reach of the virtual conduct 
into the forum.  Further, under a traditional analysis, courts would still 
be required to determine whether the Internet activity meets the other 
requirements for specific jurisdiction—relatedness and reasonableness. 
The second strain of thinking that apparently undergirds the pre-
sumption of aimlessness is the ill-conceived perception of the Internet as 
sufficiently analogous to the conventional stream of commerce to war-
rant imposing standards developed for that sphere on the Internet.  
Rather than conceive of cyberspace as a separate “place,”122 courts have 
 
 117. Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 400 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 118. Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 476 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 119. ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 713 (4th Cir. 2002); see also 
Jennings v. AC Hydraulic A/S, 383 F.3d 546, 550 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Premising personal jurisdiction on 
the maintenance of a Web site, without requiring some level of ‘interactivity’ between the defendant 
and consumers in the forum state, would create almost universal personal jurisdiction because of the 
virtually unlimited accessibility of websites across the country.”). 
 120. Throughout his book, Cyber Rights, Mike Godwin provides an insightful discussion of the 
array of fears—both rational and irrational—held by the government, business, and individuals regard-
ing the problems arising out of the advent of the Internet, such as increased exposure to pornography, 
copyright infringement on a massive scale, more widely publicized libel, a retreat from real to virtual 
communities, and the decline of privacy, to name a few.  See GODWIN, supra note 4, at 298–301. 
 121. See infra Part IV.A. 
 122. Outside of the personal jurisdiction context, the Internet has been analogized to physical 
space as a separate “place.”  See, e.g., Josh A. Goldfoot, Antitrust Implications of Internet Administra-
SPENCER.DOC 12/7/2005  2:04:03 PM 
No. 1] JURISDICTION AND THE INTERNET 89 
sought to understand the Internet for purposes of personal jurisdiction 
by comparing it to the conventional stream of commerce.  Courts find the 
placement of goods into a global distribution system that can take those 
goods anywhere (the stream of commerce) to be similar to the placement 
of information on the global data network (the Internet).123  This com-
parison has led courts to import Justice O’Connor’s view of purposeful 
availment for stream of commerce cases—that simply availing oneself of 
the stream of commerce without a specific intent to serve the forum 
market is insufficient to support an assertion of jurisdiction in the forum 
where goods may ultimately be delivered124—into the Internet context 
and to require the very same showing before Internet activity can sup-
port jurisdiction.  The district court in Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. 
King125 expressly did so when it wrote, “Creating a site, like placing a 
product into the stream of commerce, may be felt nationwide—or even 
worldwide—but, without more, it is not an act purposefully directed to-
ward the forum state.”126  The Fourth Circuit’s analogous statement that 
“a person who simply places information on the Internet does not subject 
himself to jurisdiction in each State into which the electronic signal is 
transmitted and received”127 is strikingly similar to Justice O’Connor’s 
remark in Asahi that “[t]he placement of a product into the stream of 
 
tion, 84 VA. L. REV. 909, 919 (1998) (“A popular analogy that follows from the adoption of the term 
‘cyberspace’ is the comparison of the Internet, and the resources available through it, to physical 
space.”); Alfred C. Yen, Western Frontier or Feudal Society?: Metaphors and Perceptions of Cyber-
space, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1207, 1210 (2002) (“Of the many metaphors that have been applied to 
the Internet, the most prominent and influential has been the imagination of the Internet as a sepa-
rate, new physical place known as ‘cyberspace’ . . . .”).  Many have argued that analogizing the Internet 
to a physical place is inappropriate.  See, e.g., Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the 
Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 442 (2003) (explaining that “the cyberspace as place meta-
phor leads to undesirable private control of the previously commons-like Internet and the emergence 
of a digital anticommons”); Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV. 521, 523 (2003) 
(arguing that “the CYBERSPACE AS PLACE metaphor is not a particularly good one”).  Such an 
analogy has not found its way into views of how to conceptualize the Internet for purposes of personal 
jurisdiction, with analogies to the conventional stream of commerce taking root instead. 
 123. See, e.g., Shamsuddin v. Vitamin Research Prods., 346 F. Supp. 2d 804, 815 (D. Md. 2004) 
(“VRP’s choice to sell its products over the Internet—a sort of global ‘distributor’—is similar to plac-
ing its products into the stream of commerce with the knowledge that the stream may or will sweep the 
product[s] into the forum State. . . . Insofar as VRP targets no particular forum and will sell to who-
ever [sic] wishes to buy, VRP’s placement of its products for sale through its website is no more pur-
poseful than placing products for sale on an Internet auction site.” (internal quotation marks and foot-
note omitted)). 
 124. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987). 
 125. 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 126. Id. at 301.  Commentators have explicitly made the comparison as well.  See, e.g., Gwenn M. 
Kalow, Note, From the Internet to Court: Exercising Jurisdiction over World Wide Web Communica-
tions, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2241, 2243 (1997) (“[C]ourts confronting the issue of whether to exercise 
personal jurisdiction for Internet-related activity, specifically in the context of World Wide Web com-
munications, should follow a purposeful availment approach as outlined in Justice O’Connor’s plural-
ity opinion in Asahi Metal Industry v. Superior Court.”); Howard B. Stravitz, Personal Jurisdiction in 
Cyberspace: Something More Is Required on the Electronic Stream of Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV. 925, 
927 (1998) (“The something-more requirement is derived from Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in 
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court . . . .”). 
 127. ALS Scan v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir. 2002). 
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commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully di-
rected toward the forum State.”128  The standard ultimately adopted by 
the Fourth Circuit—that defendants “direct[] electronic activity into the 
State . . . with the manifested intent of engaging in business or other in-
teractions within the State”129—is certainly derived from Justice 
O’Connor’s stream of commerce theory—which requires “an intent or 
purpose to serve the market in the forum State.”130 
But the analogy of the Internet to the stream of commerce is in-
apt.131  The conventional, real world stream of commerce is a distribution 
network connecting producers of raw materials, component parts, and 
finished goods with wholesalers, regional distributors, and retail out-
lets.132  Entities participating at one point in the network cannot always 
or necessarily control or predict where their product will be transported 
once it is has left them.  Indeed, many participants in the process may 
have little reason to concern themselves with such information.133  There 
is thus good reason not to equate mere participation in this distribution 
network with purposeful availment in a particular state.134  Contrast these 
attributes of the stream of commerce with the Internet.  The Internet is 
not a complex distribution network moving products through a chain of 
producers, manufacturers, and purveyors of goods; rather, the Internet is 
a ubiquitous medium that facilitates global communication, data trans-
 
 128. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112. 
 129. ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 714. 
 130. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112. 
 131. This is not to say that constructing metaphors for the Internet is per se inappropriate.  But 
the metaphor adopted should be fitting and should not unduly stifle thought about the medium.  Fur-
ther, reference to nontechnical concepts to describe a technical construct can lead to confused misun-
derstandings.  Goldfoot, supra note 122, at 921 (“Reasoning from unscientific terms divorced from 
technical reality can lead to unfounded conclusions.”).  As one commentator eloquently put it: 
The application of metaphor to the Internet is entirely sensible.  It is an unavoidable and useful 
human habit to compare unfamiliar objects to familiar ones.  People use apt metaphors because 
they stimulate the imagination, drawing attention to patterns and possibilities that would other-
wise have escaped attention.  If perceptions stimulated by metaphor become sufficiently in-
grained, people may adopt them as reality and make them the basis for future beliefs and actions.  
At the same time, however, it is important to separate the application of metaphor from the com-
plete apprehension of reality.  Metaphors work because they provide perspective, but the adop-
tion of one perspective necessarily omits insights offered by other perspectives.  Accordingly, in-
sight gets lost when one metaphor assumes enough prominence to crowd other ones out, 
especially if the prominent metaphor has misleading qualities. 
Yen, supra note 122, at 1209. 
 132. Justice Brennan defined the stream of commerce as the “regular and anticipated flow of 
products from manufacture to distribution to retail.”  Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117. 
 133. For example, a component part manufacturer has little reason to concern itself with where 
final products containing its parts will be marketed and sold where its compensation is unrelated to the 
volume of sales of the final product. 
 134. Simple insertion of goods into the stream of commerce, without any knowledge of their 
eventual destination does not purposefully connect an entity with any locale the goods may find them-
selves in down the line.  However, whether purposeful availment can be imputed if the participant is 
aware of where its products will be taken by the stream of commerce was the central disagreement 
between Justices O’Connor and Brennan in Asahi.  Id. at 112, 117. 
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mission, interaction, and financial/commercial transactions.135  Publishing 
a Web site on the Internet does not infuse it into an uncontrollable and 
unpredictable stream that can sweep the site hither and yon.  To the con-
trary, simple Web site publication instantly makes the information on the 
Web site available globally. 
If a Web publisher wishes to restrict the global availability of its 
content to a more limited geographical area than otherwise results from 
simply posting information on the Internet, a whole host of geographic 
mapping technologies136 enable the site operator to limit access.  The 
technology exists to identify the geographical location of prospective us-
ers (for example, through the user’s IP address137 or digital certificates138) 
and to deny entry to undesirable users.139  Alternatively, in the Web site 
context the site operator could require visitors to agree to the terms of a 
“click-wrap” agreement140 that includes a forum selection clause identify-
 
 135. Or, to put it more blandly, “The Internet is merely a simple computer protocol, a piece of 
code that permits computer users to transmit data between their computers using existing communica-
tions networks.”  Lemley, supra note 122, at 523 (“At best, ‘cyberspace’ is a convenient term describ-
ing a set of communications achieved through the Internet.” (citing Goldfoot, supra note 122, at 920)); 
see also Matwyshyn, supra note 16, at 495 (describing the Internet and other “communications net-
works” as “dynamic environments of information transmission within and with which groups of actors 
interact”). 
 136. For a thorough analysis of various geographic mapping techniques, see Venkata N. Padma-
nabhan & Lakshminarayanan Subramanian, An Investigation of Geographic Mapping Techniques for 
Internet Hosts, SIGCOMM ‘01, 173 (2001), http://www.acm.org/sigs/sigcomm/sigcomm2001/p14-
pabmanabhan.pdf. 
 137. “[A]n IP address is a 32-bit number that identifies each sender or receiver of information 
that is sent in packets across the Internet.”  Whatis.com, IP address, http://searchwebservices. 
techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,290660,sid26_gci212381,00.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2005).  Readers can 
sample such geographical identification technology by pointing their browsers to <http://www. 
ip2location.com/?AfID=17800>, where the Web site will inform you of your IP address, your geo-
graphical location, and your Internet Service Provider (ISP).  The operator of this Web site, 
IP2Location—whose motto is “Bringing Geography to the Internet”—offers software to customers 
interested identifying the geographical location of visitors to their web sites.  See Our Products, 
IP2Location, http://www.ip2location.com/?AfID=17800 (last visited Sept. 19, 2005).  It should be 
noted, however, that IP address-based blocking technologies do have their limitations, including the 
possibility that users will employ so-called anonymizers, which enable a user to “connect to a site 
through another server that hides the true origin of the user,” thereby preventing detection of their 
true geographical location.  See Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet 
Architecture And The Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815, 915 (2004).  Netscape offers a program 
called “GhostSurf” that in its words allows users to “Surf Anonymously and Protect your Privacy!”  
See Netscape, Gadgets & Tech, http://www.wugnet.com/affiliates/default.asp?pageid=96 (last visited 
Sept. 19, 2005). 
 138. Digital certificates are “The digital equivalent of an ID card used in conjunction with a 
public key encryption system.  Also called ‘digital IDs,’ digital certificates are issued by a trusted third 
party known as a ‘certification authority’ or ‘certificate authority’ (CA) such as VeriSign, Inc.”  
Techweb, Digital Certificate, http://www.techweb.com/encyclopedia/defineterm.jhtml?term=digital+ 
certificate (last visited Sept. 19, 2005). 
 139. Geist, supra note 16, at 1395–98. 
 140. A click-wrap agreement is an online agreement presented by a Web site that requires users 
to click on a button or hyperlink—such as an “I agree” or “I accept” button—that indicates their as-
sent to its terms; “the terms of use are generally non-negotiable and presented to the end user on a 
take it or leave it basis prior to he or she having to accept them, and thus, the burden has been placed 
on the end user to read and understand the terms that are presented prior to acceptance.”  Peter 
Brown, The Validity of Click-Wrap Agreements, 765 PRAC. L. INST. 111, 119 (Sept. 2003).  These are to 
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ing the jurisdiction where any resultant disputes must be litigated.141  Or 
more simply—but less effectively—Web site operators can employ geo-
graphical disclaimers (for example, statements indicating that the site is 
not intended for visitors from certain jurisdictions), require users to iden-
tify their location and deny service to those from undesired areas,142 or 
make their sites incapable of transacting business with people from a 
given location.143  Indeed, a recent survey of companies around the globe 
revealed that a substantial portion already employ a host of “jurisdiction 
avoidance mechanisms” to control the jurisdictional exposure deriving 
from their Web activities.144  These technologies are certainly not perfect 
and do not enable Web publishers to control completely the geographical 
reach of their sites.  A report commissioned by the Parisian court in 
LICRA v. Yahoo! Inc.145 estimated that a combination of geographic 
blocking techniques could successfully block only ninety percent of the 
users from a particular undesirable locale.146  Though blocking might not 
 
be distinguished from “browse-wrap” agreements, which present terms of use for visitors but do not 
require users to assent to their terms before they may proceed to use the site. 
 141. Such agreements can be enforceable if, among other things, they provide fair notice that the 
pending transaction will be subject to the agreement, if they require an affirmative act of assent on the 
part of the end user prior to the user taking action on the site, provide for cancellation of the transac-
tion in the event of nonassent, and do not contain any overly restrictive clauses.  See id. at 131–32. 
 142. Self-identification clearly is subject to users misrepresenting their geographical location, 
making it a much less effective approach than a more technologically based method.  See Solum & 
Chung, supra note 137, at 915 (“Among the methods of identifying the nationality of the users, volun-
tary registration is most likely to be an ineffective method.  Only the IP address based method would 
have any significant basis for success.”).  However, in the event that users misrepresent where they are 
located, such users may be estopped from asserting (or challenging) jurisdiction based on their true 
location in light of the misrepresentation.  If a defendant’s Web site is only available within the forum 
state if users misrepresent their location, jurisdiction would not be permissible because the forum 
would be exercising jurisdiction based on the “unilateral activity” of those users rather than the defen-
dant.  Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
 143. This was the approach adopted by the defendant in Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 
F.3d 446, 454 (3d Cir. 2003) (employing a Web site that only permitted deliveries to addresses in Spain 
to limit its reach).  There are ways to circumvent these less effective methods, which means that Web 
site operators committed to barring access beyond certain geographical areas should employ the more 
effective geographical mapping technologies described above.  See Geist, supra note 16, at 1391–1401 
for a full discussion of approaches to the problem of user identification. 
 144. Internet Jurisdiction Fears Affecting Global Business Strategy, Experts Say, 72 U.S.L.W. 2614, 
2614 (Apr. 13, 2004) [hereinafter Fears Affecting Global Business Strategy] (discussing a survey that 
found that sixty-nine percent of North American companies, forty-one percent of Asian companies 
and twenty-nine percent of European companies responding to the survey use techniques “to pinpoint 
the geographic location of specific users and block access by users hailing from that jurisdiction”); see 
also International Chamber of Commerce, Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in Electronic Commerce 
(June 6, 2001), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/home/statements_rules/statements/2001/jurisdiction 
_and_applicable_law.asp [hereinafter ICC Policy Statement] (“[C]ompanies are limiting the use of 
their websites in terms of both products and geography, and they engage in e-commerce, if at all, 
largely through closed systems with established partners or sales to residents of the territories where 
the companies are already well established.”). 
 145. Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, Nov. 20, 
2000, available at http://www.cdt.org/speech/international/001120yahoofrance.pdf (order demanding 
compliance with injunction). 
 146. Id. (“The combination of two procedures, namely geographical identification of the IP ad-
dress and declaration of nationality, would be likely to achieve a filtering success rate approaching 
90%.”). 
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be complete, such efforts would generally enable a defendant to rebut 
the presumption that it targeted a particular area and argue against a 
finding of purposeful availment based solely on their Web site.  Further-
more, as it becomes necessary for businesses and individuals operating 
through the Internet to control and limit the geographical reach of their 
actions, market demand for improved and more effective geographical 
identification techniques should increase to an extent sufficient to en-
courage the development of such technology. 
Thus, when geographically restrictive techniques are not employed, 
the global availability of an Internet posting is not only predictable, it is a 
known consequence of Web publishing.  The portion of the Internet 
where most Web sites are published is known as the World Wide Web;147 
this moniker derives from its global accessibility.148  Indeed, the absence 
of geographical (and temporal) constraints on the delivery of Web-based 
information is one of the most well known and valuable attributes of the 
Web.  The High Court of Australia made this point best in a recent 
Internet defamation case: 
However broad may be the reach of any particular means of com-
munication, those who make information accessible by a particular 
method do so knowing of the reach that their information may 
have.  In particular, those who post information on the World Wide 
Web do so knowing that the information they make available is 
available to all and sundry without any geographic restriction.149 
Because persons simply posting information on the Internet knowingly 
make the information instantaneously available throughout the world, 
Web publishing bears little similarity to placing a product into the stream 
of commerce. 
 
 147. The World Wide Web and the Internet should be distinguished; “The World Wide Web, or 
simply Web, is a way of accessing information over the medium of the Internet.  It is an information-
sharing model that is built on top of the Internet. . . . The Web also utilizes browsers, such as Internet 
Explorer or Netscape, to access Web documents called Web pages that are linked to each other via 
hyperlinks.  Web documents also contain graphics, sounds, text and video.  The Web is just one of the 
ways that information can be disseminated over the Internet.  The Internet, not the Web, is also used 
for e-mail, which relies on SMTP, Usenet news groups, instant messaging and FTP.  So the Web is just 
a portion of the Internet, albeit a large portion, but the two terms are not synonymous and should not 
be confused.”  Webopedia, The Difference Between the Internet and the World Wide Web, http:// 
www.webopedia.com/DidYouKnow/Internet/2002/Web_vs_Internet.asp (last visited Sept. 19, 2005). 
 148. Tim Berners-Lee, credited as the inventor of the World Wide Web (to be distinguished from 
the inventors of the Internet, Vint Cerf and Bob Kahn), has written that he created, “in 1990 a pro-
gram called ‘WorlDwidEweb’” with the “dream” of creating “a common information space in which 
we communicate by sharing information.  Its universality is essential:  the fact that a hypertext link can 
point to anything, be it personal, local or global. . . .”  Tim Berners-Lee, The World Wide Web: A 
Very Short Personal History, http://www.w3.org/People/Berners-Lee/ShortHistory.html (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2005).  When asked directly why he called his creation the World Wide Web, Berners-Lee 
responded, “Looking for a name for a global hypertext system, an essential element I wanted to stress 
was its decentralized form allowing anything to link to anything.  This form is mathematically a graph, 
or web.  It was designed to be global of course.”  Tim Berners-Lee, Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.w3.org/People/Berners-Lee/FAQ.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2005). 
 149. Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575, 605, available at http://www.austlii. 
edu.au/au/cases/cth/high_ct/2002/56.html. 
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More importantly, these attributes of Web publishing render the is-
sue of foreseeability, which divided the justices in Asahi,150 irrelevant in 
the Internet context; the global reach of Web-based activity is not merely 
foreseeable, it is a well-understood fact.  Thus, it seems inappropriate to 
import Justice O’Connor’s approach in Asahi—which was meant to re-
quire more than mere foreseeability as the basis for jurisdiction—to 
Internet cases where simply posting information on the Internet know-
ingly directs information into every state.151  To the contrary, Internet ac-
tors not employing geographically restrictive techniques should antici-
pate being haled into court wherever their network-mediated conduct 
gives rise to a cause of action.152 
The analogy to the stream of commerce is particularly inappropriate 
for Web publishing that is accompanied by the use of invasive software 
that is pushed onto the computers of those visiting a Web site.  Spy-
ware,153 adware,154 Trojan horses,155 and persistent cookies156 are examples 
 
 150. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 109–12 (1987) (discussing the 
debate among the lower courts and settling on the requirement that the defendant must intend to 
serve the forum market); id. at 121 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (supporting only the requirement that the 
defendant has to be aware of the marketing of its products in the forum market). 
 151. The analogy of Web publishing to placing an item into the stream of commerce has also sup-
ported arguments against regulatory jurisdiction.  As one commentator explained, in the charitable 
solicitation context, many charities with passive Web sites would be subject to regulation for solicita-
tion in every state unless some limiting principle was applied to regulation based on network-mediated 
activity.  Charles Nave, Charitable State Registration and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 31 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 227, 231–32 n.20 (2004).  The Asahi analogy provided just such a principle:  
“[E]ven though the charities could reasonably expect that residents of numerous jurisdictions would 
access the website and perhaps contribute, the charities had not purposefully availed themselves of the 
jurisdictions’ markets or courts and had no other contact with it.  Under such circumstances, regula-
tory jurisdiction over the charities would be unconstitutional.”  Id. (citing Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112–14).  
The National Association of State Charities Officials (NASCO) has adopted this logic and proposed 
the “Charleston Principles” which suggest that charities should be regulated in a particular state only if 
“(a) the charity used the Internet to specifically target (via email or other methods) donors in that ju-
risdiction or (b) the charity received contributions from that jurisdiction on a ‘repeated and ongoing 
basis or a substantial basis through its Web site.’”  Id. (quoting NASCO, THE CHARLESTON 
PRINCIPLES § III.B.1 (2001), available at http://www.nasconet.org/public.php?pubsec=4&curdoc=10). 
 152. See Robert J. Condlin, “Defendant Veto” Or “Totality Of The Circumstances”? It’s Time For 
The Supreme Court To Straighten Out The Personal Jurisdiction Standard Once Again, 54 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 53, 138 (2004) (“If a defendant does not want this kind of contact with a particular state, it has 
only to make its website inaccessible to customers in that state.”). 
 153. Spyware is defined as “[a]ny software that covertly gathers user information through the 
user’s Internet connection without his or her knowledge, usually for advertising purposes.  Spyware 
applications are typically bundled as a hidden component of freeware or shareware programs that can 
be downloaded from the Internet . . . .”  Webopedia, Spyware, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/s/ 
spyware.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2005). 
 154. Adware is defined as “[a] form of spyware that collects information about the user in order 
to display advertisements in the Web browser based on the information it collects from the user’s 
browsing patterns.”  Webopedia, Adware, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/a/adware.html (last vis-
ited Sept. 19, 2005). 
 155. A Trojan horse is “[a] destructive program that masquerades as a benign application. Unlike 
viruses, Trojan horses do not replicate themselves but they can be just as destructive.  One of the most 
insidious types of Trojan horse is a program that claims to rid your computer of viruses but instead 
introduces viruses onto your computer.”  Webopedia, Trojan Horse, http://www.webopedia.com/ 
TERM/T/Trojan_horse.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2005). 
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of such software.  Internet actors employing these technologies clearly 
are not simply setting their Web sites adrift in an unpredictable stream; 
rather, they are—through their Web sites—intentionally reaching out to 
all computers accessing those sites in a manner that surpasses mere fore-
seeability. 
The same can be said regarding the pushing of pop-up windows157 to 
the computers of those who visit a particular site.  Progenitors of pop-up 
Web pages are deliberately pushing material to a particular computer in 
response to some triggering event, such as the visitation of a particular 
Web site or the typing of certain search terms in a search engine.158  Pur-
veyors of pop-ups are more active than simple Web publishers in pushing 
electronic information to computer users, but only slightly more selective 
in their geographical reach.  Pop-up windows are not always available 
everywhere but rather are available everywhere the triggering Web-
event occurs.  Resolving whether a given pop-up window actually pre-
sented itself within a particular jurisdiction should typically not be an is-
sue, however, because in litigation arising out of pop-up material, it 
should be clear where the litigation-instigating pop-up presented and was 
viewed.  In any event, because distributors of pop-up windows intention-
ally make the pop-up information available globally—provided the req-
uisite triggering event occurs—they too should anticipate being haled 
into court wherever their pop-up material gives rise to a cause of ac-
tion.159 
 
 156. A cookie is a message given by a Web server to a computer’s Web browser.  Webopedia, 
Cookie, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/C/cookie.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2005).  The primary 
purpose is to identify users and prepare customized Web pages for them.  Id.  A persistent cookie is “a 
cookie that is stored on a user’s hard drive until it expires . . . or until the user deletes the cookie.  Per-
sistent cookies are used to collect identifying information about the user, such as Web surfing behavior 
or user preferences for a specific Web site.”  Webopedia, Persistent Cookie, http://www.webopedia. 
com/TERM/P/persistent_cookie.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2005). 
 157. A “pop-up window” is defined as “[a] window that suddenly appears (pops up) when you 
select an option with a mouse or press a special function key.”  Webopedia, Pop-up Window, http:// 
www.webopedia.com/TERM/p/pop_up_window.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2005).  A pop-up ad is a 
special type of pop-up window that appears on top of a Web browser to display advertisements.  We-
bopedia, Pop-up Ad, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/p/popup_ad.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2005).  
Such ads have proliferated significantly and have become quite pernicious.  See, e.g., Tom Spring, 
Sneaky New Form of Online Ads Pops Up, PCWORLD.COM, Dec. 6, 2002, http://www.pcworld.com/ 
news/article/0,aid,107754,00.asp (“A new breed of pop-up messages is proliferating that can evade ad-
blocking programs and may indicate a security risk as well as present a nuisance.”). 
 158. Pop-up windows can be also be initiated by “a single or double mouse click or rollover 
(sometimes called a mouseover), and also possibly by voice command or can simply be timed to oc-
cur.”  Whatis.com, Pop-up, http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/0,,sid9_gci212806,00.html (last vis-
ited Sept. 19, 2005). 
 159. Indeed, in LICRA v. Yahoo! Inc., Yahoo! was found to be engaging in this practice by push-
ing French pop-up advertisements to Web site visitors whose servers were located in France.  Tribunal 
de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, available at 
http://www.cdt.org/speech/international/001120yahoofrance.pdf (order demanding compliance with 
injunction) (“YAHOO is aware that it is addressing French parties because upon making a connection 
to its auctions site from a terminal located in France it responds by transmitting advertising banners 
written in the French language.”). 
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Forwarded emails, on the other hand, are generally more suscepti-
ble to the stream of commerce analogy.  Although the author of an email 
can control whom the original recipients of an email message are,160 once 
an email is sent, the sender of the message has no control over the even-
tual transmission of the email to other recipients and as a result, one 
cannot predict where one’s email will eventually be sent.161  Under such 
circumstances, the author of the email cannot be charged with responsi-
bility for purposeful availment of a particular locale unless the author di-
rectly intended to send it there or requested that recipients send it 
there.162  However, where an email creates in the intended recipient of 
email a cause of action against the sender, the author of the email more 
reasonably can expect to be liable in the jurisdiction with which the re-
cipient is affiliated (as opposed to wherever the email simply may have 
been read).163 
Thus, placing information on the Internet is clearly different from 
what occurs when one places a product into the stream of commerce; in 
the latter context there is little or no control over where goods end up.  
Discarding this distinction in favor of an erroneous view of the Internet 
as akin to the conventional stream of commerce has supplied courts with 
a means of bridging towards a requirement beyond mere Web publish-
ing, rendering the Internet’s ubiquity irrelevant.  That requirement has 
become the state-specific targeting that courts have identified as a requi-
site characteristic of Internet contacts before they will acknowledge the 
relevance of those contacts to a jurisdictional analysis.164 
Although courts may believe that state-specific targeting of activity 
should be required to support a finding of minimum contacts beyond the 
mere placement of a product into the stream of commerce, a similar in-
sistence on state-specific targeting of Internet activity is unwarranted 
when evaluating network-mediated contacts.  As previously discussed, 
unrestricted Web publishing knowingly and immediately pushes material 
to computers in every state.  Thus, such activity creates a direct and 
known connection between these actors and every jurisdiction that par-
 
 160. See, e.g., Internet Doorway, Inc. v. Parks, 138 F. Supp. 2d, 773, 777 (S.D. Miss. 2001) (“[T]he 
Court finds that the active as opposed to passive nature of e-mail weighs in favor of finding personal 
jurisdiction.”). 
 161. This is because one has no control over a recipient’s independent decision regarding whether 
and to whom a received email will be forwarded.  Thus, although it is foreseeable that an email can 
end up in an unintended destination, email authors ordinarily will lack a specific intent to direct their 
email to that place. 
 162. An author of an email could also arguably be charged with directed activity toward a state if 
he deliberately infuses the email with technology that will enable the email to forward itself to other 
email accounts against the will of the recipient, a common technique used in email viruses. 
 163. See Stravitz, supra note 126, at 934 (“If the Internet is used to direct communication to a par-
ticular forum state resident, for example, when an e-mail message is sent and delivered, the Internet is 
not any different than other forms of direct communication.  Courts have had little difficulty applying 
conventional analysis in these circumstances.”). 
 164. See, e.g., Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 475–76 (5th Cir. 2002) (declining to find purposeful 
availment because the Internet posting targeted the whole world, rather than that forum in particular). 
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ticipants in the conventional stream of commerce arguably lack.  No fur-
ther targeting besides the act of posting information on the Internet 
should be required to connect an Internet actor’s conduct with any given 
state. 
B. The Irrelevance of Interactivity 
The presumption of aimlessness has also led courts to give more 
weight to Internet activity that takes place in the context of “interactive” 
Web sites than activity occurring within “passive” Web sites.  The rea-
soning behind this preference seems to be that passive sites are perceived 
as being incapable of demonstrating the state-specific targeting generally 
required to support an assertion of jurisdiction under contemporary for-
mulations of the Zippo-influenced jurisdictional tests.165  In other words, 
given that Internet activity is presumed to target no state because it is 
broadcast to every state, the degree to which the Web site permits forum 
residents to interact with it—and then the extent to which such interac-
tion actually occurs—is treated as evidence that the Web site has delib-
erately engaged the forum in a way that a passive Web site (seemingly) 
cannot. 
The difficulty here is that the interactivity of a Web site actually 
bears no relationship to whether the defendant has purposefully availed 
itself of the forum state, particularly once the presumption of aimlessness 
is discarded.  Rather, the conduct relevant to a purposeful availment 
analysis is that which gives rise to the cause of action.  Network-mediated 
contacts can give rise to several different types of claims:  breach of con-
tract claims; tort claims, including negligence, products liability, and in-
tentional torts such as defamation or fraud, breach of implied warranty, 
etc.; and intellectual property claims such as patent, trademark, and 
copyright infringement.  For none of these claims does the degree of in-
teractivity of the Web sites—the medium through which contacts giving 
rise to the cause of action are mediated—determine whether those con-
tacts will be credited for purposeful availment purposes under the Su-
preme Court’s standards. 
For example, when a breach of contract claim is at issue, Supreme 
Court precedents such as McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.166 
and Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz167 instruct courts to consider the 
connection the contract has with the state, such as whether the defendant 
has knowingly entered into a contract with a forum resident, and whether 
 
 165. See, e.g., Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 890 (6th cir. 2002) (“Such 
intentional interaction with the residents of a forum state, the Zippo court concluded, is evidence of a 
conscious choice to transact business with inhabitants of a forum state in a way that the passive posting 
of information accessible from anywhere in the world is not.” (citing Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot 
Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1126 (W.D. Pa. 1997))). 
 166. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
 167. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
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the defendant has undertaken obligations or performed actions under 
the contract that may be fairly located in or connected with the forum 
state.168  Thus, the Court has stated, where the defendant has 
created “continuing obligations” between himself and residents of 
the forum, he manifestly has availed himself of the privilege of con-
ducting business there, and because his activities are shielded by 
“the benefits and protections” of the forum’s laws it is presump-
tively not unreasonable to require him to submit to the burdens of 
litigation in that forum as well.169 
A passive Web site is as capable of originating a contractual rela-
tionship with forum residents as is an interactive Web site.  To illustrate, 
consider a hypothetical Web site that simply advertises a product and en-
courages readers to contact the purveyor of the product for more infor-
mation or to purchase that product.  That Web site—though “passive” 
under prevailing parlance—can be the instigator of what becomes a con-
tractual relationship, a relationship that arises out of the passive Web site 
and the seller’s additional actions placing itself into an actual contractual 
relationship with forum residents.  The seller in this example has directed 
activity toward forum residents by (1) posting an unrestricted Web site 
on the Internet that is accessible in the forum; (2) soliciting all visitors to 
the site, including those residing within the forum, to purchase the prod-
uct; and (3) entering into a contract with the forum resident by selling 
and delivering the product.  The underlying Web site’s passivity in no 
way undermines the strength of these contacts or even colors the analysis 
under traditional principles. 
The level of interactivity exhibited by a Web site is of even less rele-
vance when the claim sounds in tort or asserts an intellectual property 
violation.  Passive Web sites are fully capable of facilitating the commis-
sion of fraud, defamation, trademark infringement, and the like because 
these wrongs can be committed through words, images, and sounds, phe-
nomena that passive Web sites can display.  The relevant contacts in such 
cases are the allegedly wrongful acts that give rise to the claims, such as 
false statements, libelous comments, or the use of a protected mark.  The 
medium through which these contacts are transmitted into the forum can 
be an interactive Web site, but it need not be; these contacts are as easily 
directed into a forum via passive Web sites. 
The requirement of interactivity is also problematic because it is 
rooted in a Web-centric view of Internet activity that does not reflect the 
full breadth of network-mediated activity possible through the Internet.  
 
 168. See id. at 473 (“[W]ith respect to interstate contractual obligations, we have emphasized that 
parties who ‘reach out beyond one state and create continuing relationships and obligations with citi-
zens of another state’ are subject to regulation and sanctions in the other State for the consequences of 
their activities.” (quoting Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647 (1950))); McGee, 355 
U.S. at 223 (“It is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract which had 
substantial connection with that State.”). 
 169. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 (citation omitted). 
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That is, courts conceive the Internet largely as a system of Web sites and 
the relevant question for them becomes what type of Web site is at issue.  
But a broader view of the Internet as a network that facilitates a wide 
range of activity beyond the publication of Web sites—such as the trans-
mission of data, the facilitation of person-to-person communication 
(through email, instant messaging, chat rooms/discussion groups, online 
telephony, etc.), or the performance of services—is closer to the reality 
of the medium.  Under this broader and more accurate view, defendants 
can utilize the Internet to engage in harmful activity without having to 
publish a Web site that forum residents must visit.  Emphasizing what 
really matters—such as the defendant’s actions of soliciting and entering 
into a contract, the making of false statements, the misuse of protected 
material—rather than Web sites—which are merely one vehicle through 
which these actions may be mediated—should enable courts to recognize 
that Web site interactivity has a very limited role in determining whether 
a defendant has purposefully availed itself of the forum.  At bottom, the 
interactivity requirement is an extraneous requirement that is not re-
quired by the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. 
C. The Frustration of the Calder “Effects” Test 
Finally, in the context of alleged intentional wrongdoing, Zippo-
based approaches wrongly fixate on the degree to which the content of 
Web sites targets a state, instead of on the proper focus under the stan-
dard articulated in Calder v. Jones:170  the residence of the victim and the 
place of his or her harm.  In Calder, the Supreme Court addressed the is-
sue of whether out-of-state defendants could be subjected to jurisdiction 
in California for allegedly defaming Shirley Jones, a California resident, 
in articles published in the National Enquirer, which had a national circu-
lation including California.171  The Court first indicated that when engag-
ing in a specific jurisdiction analysis “a court properly focuses on ‘the re-
lationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation’” and 
added that a plaintiff’s contacts “may be so manifold as to permit juris-
diction when it would not exist in their absence.”172  After finding that 
the plaintiff’s harm was suffered in California where she worked and re-
sided, the court concluded “[j]urisdiction over petitioners is therefore 
proper in California based on the ‘effects’ of their Florida conduct in 
California.”173  When the defendants claimed that they were not respon-
sible for the California circulation of the articles as mere employees of 
the Enquirer, the Court replied as follows: 
 
 170. 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
 171. Id. at 784–86. 
 172. Id. at 788 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)). 
 173. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789–90. 
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[P]etitioners are not charged with mere untargeted negligence.  
Rather, their intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were ex-
pressly aimed at California. . . . [The defendants] edited an article 
that they knew would have a potentially devastating impact upon 
[Shirley Jones].  And they knew that the brunt of that injury would 
be felt by respondent in the State in which she lives and works and 
in which the National Enquirer has its largest circulation.174 
It was the targeting of the defendants’ “allegedly tortious[] actions” that 
mattered most here; as the Court concluded, “In this case, petitioners are 
primary participants in an alleged wrongdoing intentionally directed at a 
California resident, and jurisdiction over them is proper on that basis.”175  
Calder thus provided a standard for evaluating assertions of jurisdiction 
based on intentional torts, making it clear that intentional tortfeasors 
would be amenable to jurisdiction where the targets of their wrongdoing 
reside and suffer harm.176 
Prevailing approaches to evaluating assertions of jurisdiction based 
on Internet activity frustrate Calder’s proper application where an inten-
tional tort is at issue because they focus on the target audience for Web 
content rather than the target of wrongdoing—the alleged victim in the 
case.  But Internet activity can cause harm in a state regardless of 
whether the activity occurs within a Web site whose content is targeted at 
that state.177  For example, where a Web site defames a person within a 
state or infringes a patent held by a state resident, that Web site causes 
harm to the victim in that state, even if the Web site targets viewers from 
or seeks interaction with persons in other places.178  The geographical 
targets of the Web publisher’s enterprise bear no necessary and exclusive 
relationship to who the victims of a Web site’s harm may actually be.  
Where the location of the victim diverges from the locales intended to be 
served by the defendant’s Web site, that victim’s connection with the 
state, the defendant’s knowing delivery of the Web site into the victim’s 
 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Elsewhere I have argued that there are three important principles that can be distilled from 
Calder: 
First, the . . . Court indicated that a plaintiff’s contacts with a forum are not only relevant to a 
minimum contacts analysis, but they can be of sufficient quantity and quality so as to provide a 
sufficient basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction.  Second, out-of-state conduct that fo-
cuses its harmful effects toward an individual residing in a particular state affords that state the 
right to assert jurisdiction over the out-of-state wrongdoer.  Third, perpetrators of intentional 
torts can “anticipate being haled into court” in the place where the targets of their wrongful ac-
tions reside. 
A. Benjamin Spencer, Terminating Calder: “Effects” Based Jurisdiction in the Ninth Circuit After 
Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 197, 201–02 (2004) (citations omit-
ted). 
 177. See, e.g., Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Balt. Football Club Ltd. P’ship, 34 F.3d 410, 411–
12 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that the use of an in-state company’s trademark by an out-of-state entity 
creates personal jurisdiction because “the injury will be felt mainly in” the forum). 
 178. Andrea Matwyshyn has also made the point that the Zippo-inspired approach does not typi-
cally allow courts to exercise jurisdiction over those who use the Internet to commit defamation.  See 
Matwyshyn, supra note 16, at 496 n.13. 
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state via the Internet, and the relationship between the Web site and the 
victim’s cause of action, should establish jurisdiction under the principles 
described in Calder. 
The problem is that courts have consistently applied the Zippo-
based approaches in a way that conflicts with the standard established in 
Calder by ignoring the targeting of the harmful conduct at issue.179  For 
example, in Young v. New Haven Advocate,180 a case involving alleged 
defamation by a local Connecticut newspaper of a Virginia prison war-
den, the allegation was that defamatory statements were made about a 
Virginia resident and published in Virginia via the Internet.181  Instead of 
inquiring about the targeting of the defendants’ “allegedly tortious[] ac-
tions” as is appropriate under Calder, the court asked about the target 
audience for the defendants’ Web content.182  This focus came not from 
Calder, but ALS Scan, where the Fourth Circuit concluded that “applica-
tion of Calder in the Internet context requires proof that the out-of-state 
defendant’s Internet activity is expressly targeted at or directed to the fo-
rum state.”183  Having focused on the newspapers’ target audience, the 
Young court concluded, “The newspapers did not post materials on the 
Internet with the manifest intent of targeting Virginia readers.  Accord-
ingly, the newspapers could not have ‘reasonably anticipate[d] being 
haled into court [in Virginia] to answer for the truth of the statements 
made in their article[s].’”184 
But this is incorrect.  By allegedly targeting a victim the publisher 
knew to work and reside in Virginia, it could anticipate having to answer 
for the attack in Virginia courts.  A skilled marksman who intends to 
demonstrate his shooting skills to his fellow Kentuckians by shooting 
across the border into Virginia, is aiming his conduct at a Kentucky audi-
ence.  But the target of his wrongdoing is the hapless Virginian who hap-
pens to get shot in the process.  Any person who targets wrongdoing at a 
victim found residing within a particular state can anticipate having to 
answer for that wrongdoing in the courts of that state.  That is the essen-
tial holding and logic of Calder.  The court in Carefirst of Maryland, Inc. 
v. Carefirst Pregnancy Centers, Inc.185—where the Fourth Circuit faced 
the question “whether an Illinois organization subjected itself to personal 
jurisdiction in Maryland by operating an Internet website that allegedly 
infringed the trademark rights of a Maryland insurance company”186—
 
 179. See Denis T. Rice & Julia Gladstone, An Assessment of the Effects Test in Determining Per-
sonal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 58 BUS. LAW. 601, 627–42 (2003), for a discussion of how federal 
courts have applied the Calder “effects” test to evaluate personal jurisdiction in the Internet context. 
 180. 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 181. Id. at 260. 
 182. Id. at 263. 
 183. Id. at 262–63 (citing ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th 
Cir. 2002)). 
 184. Id. (quoting Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984)). 
 185. 334 F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 186. Id. at 393. 
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committed the same mistake.  Faced with allegations of trademark in-
fringement, the court evaluated the targeting of the defendant’s Web site 
rather than of its infringing conduct,187 again conflicting with Calder’s 
admonition that it is the target of the tortious actions that is relevant to a 
jurisdictional analysis.  As discussed previously, other circuits also re-
quire that Web sites generally target states or their residents as a group 
in the context of intentional torts to support jurisdiction.188 
Requiring the targeting of activity in these types of cases toward 
“Marylanders” or the “State of Maryland” is not a sensible requirement.  
The targets of wrongdoing are those victimized by it.  Courts should not 
evaluate whether a wrongdoer has targeted the victim’s fellow state resi-
dents or the State itself because Calder accords such considerations little 
relevance:  “Jurisdiction is about contacts with a forum, not comments 
about it, and comments do not have a greater connection with a forum 
simply because they mention or discuss it (or fail to).”189  What should be 
and is relevant under Calder is that the victim was the target of the 
wrongdoing and whether that victim is a resident of the forum State.  It is 
the status of the victim as a resident of the State that renders the State 
the focal point of the victim’s injury and gives the State its interest in ad-
judicating the dispute.190  Those who intentionally violate copyrights or 
defame others are not targeting the State of X or the People of the State 
of X; rather, they are targeting their victims.  Continued reliance on an 
analysis that focuses on the targeting of these irrelevant others only de-
nies jurisdiction where it should be upheld.  Further, requiring special-
ized state-specific targeting of Web sites seemingly insulates those oper-
ating Web sites with a more generalized national focus from jurisdiction 
in any state, a result that is contrary to logic and provides too facile a 
method for web operators to avoid local jurisdiction. 
The focus of circuit decisions on the targeting of Web sites instead 
of the harmful actions alleged to reside within them likely owes much to 
the circumspect view that the courts have of Calder in general.191  Many 
 
 187. Id. at 400–01 (4th Cir. 2003) (“CPC must have acted with the ‘manifest intent’ of targeting 
Marylanders. . . . [W]e find it pertinent that the overall content of CPC’s website has a strongly local 
[metropolitan Chicago] character. . . .”). 
 188. See supra Part III. 
 189. Condlin, supra note 152, at 143–44. 
 190. See id. at 143 (2004) (“Defamatory comments destroy a person’s reputation whether they 
mention the forum state or not, and whether residents of that state read them or not.  The ‘focal point’ 
of a defamation is usually where the defamed person has the most highly developed reputation (be-
cause that is where there is the greatest potential for reputational harm to be done), and typically that 
is the person’s home state.”). 
 191. As one district court within the Fourth Circuit recently observed, “the Fourth Circuit has 
seemed to require more than the Calder ‘effects-test’ to hold exercises of jurisdiction over foreign tort-
feasors constitutional.”  Cole-Tuve, Inc. v. Am. Mach. Tools Corp., 342 F. Supp. 2d 362, 367 (D. Md. 
2004).  Indeed, there has been a larger discussion about the strength of Calder as a jurisdictional 
precedent, with some suggesting that the decision is too out of step with other personal jurisdiction 
case law to serve as the grounding for an approach to resolving problems of jurisdiction in the Internet 
context.  See, e.g., Matwyshyn, supra note 16, at 517 (“Calder is a fatally-flawed jurisdictional prece-
dent; reliance upon it weakens the potency of any approach.”); see also Redish, supra note 16, at 597 
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circuits have interpreted Calder in a way that uncouples a defendant’s 
tortious conduct from other state-affiliating conduct by the defendant.192  
Thus, apart from the fact that a defendant’s conduct causes injury to the 
plaintiff in his or her state of residence, these courts require “the defen-
dant’s own [sufficient minimum] contacts with the state if jurisdic-
tion . . . is to be upheld.”193  That requirement has led courts to discount 
the targeting of the defendants’ “allegedly tortious[] actions”194 and look 
instead for “other contacts.”195  That is, courts are evaluating who the de-
fendant’s target “audience” is rather than who the victim of the allegedly 
intentionally tortious conduct is.  But as the Calder Court made clear, it 
is the targeting of wrongdoing, not of the medium of its transmission, 
that matters.196  In the end, contemporary Zippo-based approaches to 
evaluating Internet contacts simply import a confused interpretation of 
Calder into the Internet context, which largely explains how courts have 
evaluated jurisdiction in Internet cases. 
 
(“Calder’s ‘focal point’ analysis is inescapably inconsistent with the controlling purposeful availment 
test . . . ”).  However, as I have argued elsewhere, Calder was consistent with the Court’s original ar-
ticulation of the modern personal jurisdiction standard in International Shoe.  See Spencer, supra note 
176, at 219–20 (“[I]n what appeared to be a return to the unitary personal jurisdiction analysis origi-
nally contemplated in International Shoe, the Calder Court engaged in a unified evaluation of the de-
fendants contacts to determine if jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice’ 
without separately considering purposeful availment and reasonableness.”).  Further, Calder was ar-
ticulating a standard for intentional torts, conduct not addressed by prior jurisdictional precedent, and 
thus represents a somewhat unique approach that the Court felt was appropriate in such a context.  
Thus, the dismissive views of Calder do not deserve much credence and certainly should not serve to 
undermine its strength as sound jurisdictional precedent. 
 192. See, e.g., Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 258–59 (3d Cir. 2001) (requiring forum targeting 
beyond mere targeting of a plaintiff residing within the forum); Brokerwood Int’l (U.S.), Inc. v. Cui-
sine Crotone, Inc., 104 F. App’x 376, 382 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he effects test is not a substitute for a 
nonresident’s minimum contacts that demonstrate purposeful availment of the benefits of the forum 
state.” (quoting Allied v. Moore & Peterson, 117 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 1997))).  But see Miller Yacht 
Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 96 n.2 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Under [the Calder ‘effects’] test, a party is sub-
ject to personal jurisdiction in a state when his or her tortious actions were intentionally directed at 
that state and those actions caused harm in that state.”); Guidry v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 188 F.3d 619, 628 
(5th Cir. 1999) (“Even an act done outside the state that has consequences or effects within the state 
will suffice as a basis of jurisdiction in a suit arising from those consequences if the effects are seriously 
harmful and were intended or highly likely to follow from the nonresident defendant’s conduct.”).  See 
Rice & Gladstone, supra note 179, at 608–13, for a more complete discussion of how Calder has been 
interpreted and applied in the various federal circuits. 
 193. ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 626 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 194. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984). 
 195. ESAB Group, 126 F.3d at 625; see also Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 473 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(“[T]he ‘effects’ test is but one facet of the ordinary minimum contacts analysis, to be considered as 
part of the full range of the defendant’s contacts with the forum. . . . [T]he plaintiff’s residence in the 
forum, and suffering of harm there, will not alone support jurisdiction under Calder.” (footnote omit-
ted)). 
 196. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789. 
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IV. A PROPOSED APPROACH: APPLYING TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS TO 
INTERNET FACT PATTERNS 
Zippo-based approaches to evaluating jurisdiction based on net-
work-mediated contacts are flawed in many respects.  However, courts 
have migrated to the Zippo framework and away from traditional analy-
sis in order to forestall universal jurisdiction.  But universal jurisdiction 
does not inevitably result from applying traditional principles to Internet 
fact patterns.  Thus, until Congress or the Supreme Court indicates that 
traditional analysis deserves alteration in the Internet context, courts 
should apply traditional principles.  This Part will present an analytical 
approach that will facilitate courts’ application of traditional principles to 
cases involving network-mediated contacts. 
A. The Limiting Aspects of Traditional Analysis 
To support specific jurisdiction,197 traditional jurisdictional princi-
ples require that defendants purposefully availed themselves of the privi-
lege of acting within the state, that such activity gave rise to the cause of 
action, and that the assertion of jurisdiction is constitutionally reason-
able.198  In the context of intentional torts, the Supreme Court has held 
that defendants are amenable to personal jurisdiction in states where 
they direct their intentionally tortious conduct and produce harmful “ef-
fects.”199  The circuit courts have shied away from these principles where 
Internet contacts are concerned for fear that universal jurisdiction would 
result.  “[B]ecause the Internet is omnipresent,” the argument goes, per-
mitting electronic contacts to fulfill the minimum contacts requirement 
would make “[t]he person placing information on the Internet . . . subject 
to personal jurisdiction in every State.”200  Commentators fearing the ad-
vent of nationwide jurisdiction have similarly suggested that recognizing 
Internet contacts as minimum contacts would subject Internet actors to 
jurisdiction in every state.201 
 
 197. This article does not address whether a Web site or other Internet activity should suffice to 
establish general jurisdiction over Internet actors. 
 198. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 476–77 (1985); Christian Science Bd. 
of Dirs. of the First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Nolan, 259 F.3d 209, 216 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 199. Calder, 465 U.S. at 790 (“[P]etitioners are primary participants in an alleged wrongdoing in-
tentionally directed at a California resident, and jurisdiction over them is proper on that basis.”).  The 
Calder “effects” test has been applied beyond the strict context of intentional torts to cover cases in-
volving statutory violations akin to torts, for example copyright and trademark infringement.  See, e.g., 
Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1998) (indicating that alleged trade-
mark infringement is “akin to a tort case” and thus warrants application of the Calder “effects” test). 
 200. ALS Scan Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 712 (4th Cir. 2002); see also id. 
at 713 (“[I]t would be difficult to accept a structural arrangement in which each State has unlimited 
judicial power over every citizen in each other State who uses the Internet.”). 
 201. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 122, at 529 (“Rote application of personal jurisdiction 
rules . . . would lead inexorably to the conclusion that anyone who puts up a website is amenable to 
suit anywhere on the planet, on the theory that they have sent their ‘products’ into each and every fo-
rum.”); Stravitz, supra note 126, at 939 (“Because a web site is accessible at all times to Internet users 
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Contrary to these concerns, universal jurisdiction does not inevita-
bly follow from the application of traditional jurisdictional principles to 
Internet contacts.  Acceptance of the true nature of Internet activity as 
intentional conduct that, absent the employment of restrictive measures, 
knowingly broadcasts itself globally instead results only in a presumed 
satisfaction of the purposeful availment requirement in every jurisdic-
tion.  Those who engage in activity on the Internet—passive or other-
wise—know that the information they post on the Web is available glob-
ally, unless they attempt to limit such global availability.  The availability 
of geographic mapping or identification technology202 undermines the ar-
gument that posting on the World Wide Web cannot be used at least to 
presume an intent to serve the entire globe.203  Because such technology 
exists, those publishing on the Web who do not employ any of these 
methods persist in willful blindness to the location of those who visit and 
use their Web site.  This chosen ignorance can no longer serve as a shield 
against being deemed to target the entire globe with a posting on the 
Web.204  Given the awareness that defendants have of the global reach 
that Web publishing will give them, and their purposeful availment of the 
advantages that the ubiquity of the Internet presents, the burden should 
be on defendants to establish that they did not intend to interact with any 
persons within a particular forum through their Web activity.  If they 
cannot meet this burden, defendants should be unable to argue that they 
were not on notice that their conduct would be seen as reaching out to 
jurisdictions throughout the world. 
Although this view of Internet activity supports at least a presump-
tion that such actors have purposefully availed themselves of every juris-
diction, other elements of the standard for asserting specific jurisdic-
 
in any particular forum, it is reasonable to require additional conduct, beyond putting up the web site, 
to establish minimum contacts.  Otherwise, personal jurisdiction over web site creators would have no 
rational limits.”); Note, No Bad Puns: A Different Approach to the Problem of Personal Jurisdiction 
and the Internet, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1822 (2003) (“In fact, faithful application of the usual test 
for personal jurisdiction arguably leads to the conclusion that maintaining a website constitutes pur-
poseful availment of every state in the country.  This phenomenon threatens to render the purposeful 
availment prong meaningless when Internet activities serve as the relevant contacts with the forum 
state.”). 
 202. See supra text accompanying notes 136–46. 
 203. The existence of such technology also undermines the suggestion that a state seeking to limit 
the reach of a Web site into that state necessarily will limit the reach of the Web site into every state.  
See Salvado, supra note 16, at 76–77 (posing a hypothetical where a Maryland court ordered the re-
moval of a Web site offensive to Maryland law, thereby forcing the Web site operator to shut it down 
entirely and making the Web site unavailable in any state).  Where a court finds that a Web site of-
fends a particular state’s law, geographic mapping technology means that the Web site operator is ca-
pable of making the Web site unavailable in that state but still available elsewhere. 
 204. Geist, supra note 16, at 1402 (“Although some authors have suggested that the Internet ren-
ders intent and knowledge [of a user’s geographical location] obsolete by virtue of the Internet’s archi-
tecture, the geographic identification technologies described above do not support this view.” (foot-
note omitted)); see also Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 471 (D. Mass. 
1997) (finding it “troublesome to allow those who conduct business on the Web to insulate themselves 
against jurisdiction in every state, except in the state (if any) where they are physically located.”). 
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tion205 serve to limit the breadth of jurisdictional consequences that such 
a conclusion might initially suggest.  The arising-out-of or “relatedness” 
requirement connects the relevant network-mediated contact to the 
cause of action in a way that provides a substantial layer of limitation.  
That is, Internet actors are not automatically subject to jurisdiction eve-
rywhere for anything; rather, jurisdiction only becomes possible in those 
jurisdictions where the network-mediated activity gives rise to a cause of 
action.206 
The requirement that the assertion of jurisdiction be constitution-
ally reasonable provides an additional needed check against universal ju-
risdiction in most instances.  When assessing whether an assertion of ju-
risdiction is constitutionally reasonable, courts evaluate “the burden on 
the defendant, the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the 
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the inter-
state judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution 
of controversies, and the shared interest of the several States in further-
ing fundamental substantive social policies.”207  In the context of a dis-
pute involving a Web site giving rise to a cause of action in a particular 
state, consideration of these factors will necessarily narrow the otherwise 
broad scope of jurisdiction based on network-mediated contacts. 
For many defendants, defending in terribly distant locales may be 
deemed so “gravely difficult” that they suffer a constitutionally signifi-
cant disadvantage in presenting their case compared with their oppo-
nents.208  Although such circumstances should be increasingly rare in 
modern times,209 particularly for corporate parties, in such a case the rea-
 
 205. The use of Internet contacts as a basis for general jurisdiction is a much more difficult ques-
tion that courts are only now beginning to address.  See, e.g., Lakin v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 348 F.3d 
704, 710–13 (8th Cir. 2003) (discussing general jurisdiction in the Internet context). 
 206. See, e.g., Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Propet USA, Inc., 62 F. App’x 322, 338 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (“To subject a nonresident corporate defendant, such as Costco, to suit in Louisiana solely on 
the basis of a minuscule number of e-commerce sales that are unrelated to the cause of the plaintiff’s 
alleged injury would, we think, render established jurisdictional boundaries meaningless.” (emphasis 
added)).  I rely upon the more stringent proximate cause standard of relatedness, which is more con-
sistent with the Supreme Court’s interest in basing jurisdiction on purposeful conduct that will enable 
defendants to predict where jurisdiction may attach.  See, e.g., Nowak v. Tak How Invs., 94 F.3d 708, 
715 (1st Cir. 1996) (“Adherence to a proximate cause standard is likely to enable defendants better to 
anticipate which conduct might subject them to a state’s jurisdiction than a more tenuous link in the 
chain of causation.”).  However, the Supreme Court has not definitively resolved whether the proxi-
mate cause or the more tenuous “but for” causation variant of the relatedness requirement is appro-
priate for jurisdictional analysis.  See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589 (1991) (ac-
cepting the case for review to consider the degree of relatedness required for personal jurisdiction 
analysis but avoiding the question by deciding the case on other grounds). 
 207. Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. v. Nolan, 259 F.3d 209, 217 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Burger King 
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985)). 
 208. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478 (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 
(1972)). 
 209. In describing the increasing ease with which parties can litigate in remote locales, one com-
mentator wrote as follows: 
[T]he Internet is an efficient and rapid means of communication, and coupled with similar pro-
gress in transportation, defending a suit in a remote jurisdiction may be less of a burden today 
than in the past.  For example, some courts allow parties to electronically file their pleadings via 
SPENCER.DOC 12/7/2005  2:04:03 PM 
No. 1] JURISDICTION AND THE INTERNET 107 
sonableness analysis can serve to prevent the assertion of jurisdiction.  
Similarly, when a state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute is slight, per-
haps because vindication of state policies may not be at stake, it may be 
unreasonable, given burdens on the defendant, to allow jurisdiction un-
der those circumstances.210  Indeed, when the plaintiff has little to no re-
lationship with the forum, the defendant’s lack of connection with the fo-
rum beyond Internet contacts may also serve to undermine the 
constitutional reasonableness of an assertion of personal jurisdiction.  Fi-
nally, for extreme situations when the chosen forum is substantially bur-
densome or inconvenient for the defendant, the defendant may seek a 
transfer to an alternate venue211 or dismissal on forum non conveniens 
grounds.212  The bottom line is that the reasonableness prong of the per-
sonal jurisdiction test, or the availability of venue transfers and forum 
non conveniens dismissals, should enable courts to protect defendants 
against having to litigate in burdensome or inappropriate forums.213  Such 
an approach would enable courts to avoid contorting traditional princi-
ples, while channeling their concerns through features of the traditional 
approach when appropriate. 
There are difficulties with the reasonableness prong of the personal 
jurisdiction test.  Specifically, the “fairness factors” may be charged with 
being no more than a totality-of-the-circumstances test that is infinitely 
malleable in the hands of different courts.  Under such a test, the argu-
ment goes, judges are permitted to reach widely divergent jurisdictional 
outcomes, a result that undermines predictability and suggests that rea-
sonableness may not adequately check jurisdictional excesses.214  Al-
though these charges have some validity, they speak to the shortcomings 
of traditional jurisdictional analysis on the whole, not to its application in 
the Internet context in particular.  Much of what may be wrong with tra-
 
the Internet, rather than filing in person at the courthouse.  Some courts also allow litigants to 
participate via the telephone.  Litigants can also maintain contact with each other and the court 
via e-mail. 
TiTi Nguyen, A Survey of Personal Jurisdiction Based on Internet Activity: A Return to Tradition, 19 
BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 519, 524 (2004) (footnotes omitted). 
 210. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114–15 (1987) (discussing 
California’s diminished interest in resolving a dispute between two foreign entities). 
 211. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (transfer of venue statute); see also, e.g., Response Reward Sys-
tems, L.C. v. Meijer, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1339–40 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (granting Michigan defen-
dant’s motion, in a patent infringement action, to transfer venue where the defendant’s only contact 
with the forum state, Florida, was the availability of infringing material on its Web site). 
 212. See, e.g., McNeil v. Stanley Works, 33 F. App’x 322, 325 (9th Cir. 2002) (“McNeil is a Cana-
dian citizen, and Stanley a Connecticut citizen. . . . The dispute’s only tie to California is McNeil’s reg-
istration of Internet domain names through a registrar whose principal office is in San Francisco, Cali-
fornia. . . . Accordingly, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that 
the private interest factors, such as the residence of the parties and the forum’s convenience to the 
litigants, witnesses, and[] sources of proof, favor litigation in Canada, rather than California.”). 
 213. For an argument suggesting that defendants’ concerns regarding burden and inconvenience 
are more properly accommodated by the doctrines of venue and forum non conveniens, see A. Benja-
min Spencer, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 
2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=781904. 
 214. Note, supra note 201, at 1838. 
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ditional jurisdictional analysis can be linked to the problems inherent in 
the test’s reasonableness prong; however, revision of traditional analysis 
in toto will be required to address that issue.215  The point here is that net-
work-mediated contacts should not be treated differently than other con-
tacts.  Further, when grossly inappropriate assertions of jurisdiction are 
sought to be avoided in this context, the reasonableness prong should be 
the means through which courts exercise their judgment to limit or deny 
jurisdiction, as opposed to utilizing newly fashioned Internet-specific ap-
proaches. 
When the cause of action involves allegations of intentionally tor-
tious conduct, the threat of universal jurisdiction on the basis of the ap-
plication of traditional jurisdictional principles is mitigated by the limita-
tions of the principles embodied in the Calder “effects” test.  Only when 
the alleged wrongdoer intentionally directed its tortious actions at a fo-
rum resident can the state exercise jurisdiction under the Calder test.216  
Thus, although a defendant, based on its unrestricted Web site, will be 
presumed to have availed itself of jurisdictions throughout the world, the 
target of the tortious conduct will typically be based in only one or a 
handful of those jurisdictions.  As a result, jurisdiction will not be univer-
sal but limited to those jurisdictions where the target of the defendant’s 
allegedly tortious conduct resides.  For example, in Young, application of 
these principles to the defendant newspapers’ Web publication of alleg-
edly defamatory material would only expose them to jurisdiction where 
the alleged victim of the defamation lived and worked—Virginia.217 
The jurisdictional consequences of such an application of Calder are 
admittedly broader than those that arise from the more limited interpre-
tation of the “effects” test that require defendants to have their “own 
[sufficient minimum] contacts with the state” apart from the connection 
engendered by the commission of an intentional tort against a forum 
resident.218  But, as already mentioned, many circuits’ view of Calder is 
out of step with the actual holding in that case, which focuses on the tar-
get of the defendant’s intentionally tortious conduct.219  Indeed, wrong-
doers should anticipate being sued where their victims are located and 
suffer harm, whether they employ the Internet to do so or not.  Where 
the victim is a forum resident, it is the victim’s status as a forum resident 
that gives the defendant its connection with the state and empowers the 
state to hear the suit under Calder.220 
 
 215. See Spencer, supra note 213, for a proposed revision to personal jurisdiction doctrine. 
 216. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (“[P]etitioners are primary participants in an al-
leged wrongdoing intentionally directed at a California resident, and jurisdiction over them is proper 
on that basis.”). 
 217. 315 F.3d 256, 261–62 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 218. ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 626 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 219. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789. 
 220. See id. at 788 (“The plaintiff’s . . . ‘contacts’ . . . may be so manifold as to permit jurisdiction 
when it would not exist in their absence.”). 
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B. A Proposed Approach 
The discussion above suggests that no Internet-specific standard is 
needed to evaluate personal jurisdiction based on Internet contacts.  
However, one can formulate traditional principles in a way that will fa-
cilitate their proper application in the Internet context.  Specifically, 
Zippo-based approaches should be discarded in favor of the following:  a 
state may, consistent with due process, exercise judicial power over a 
person outside of the State when that person (1) purposefully directs ac-
tivity into the state via virtual networks; (2) that activity gives rise to, in a 
person within the State, a potential cause of action cognizable in the 
State’s courts; and (3) the assertion of jurisdiction is constitutionally rea-
sonable. 
Under the first prong of this test, tortious conduct—whether it be 
negligent, intentional, or otherwise—is presumed to be directed at a state 
or its residents if it is made available in the state via the Internet.  The 
same holds true for commercial or contractual contacts mediated through 
the Internet; commercial activity is presumed to be directed at a state 
and its residents when it is made available on an unrestricted basis to us-
ers of the Internet in that state.  Courts in France and Australia recently 
exercised jurisdiction over two U.S.-based companies based on this rea-
soning.221 
Plaintiffs would bear the initial burden of establishing purposeful 
availment as they currently do under traditional jurisdictional analysis.  
However, that burden could be discharged by a showing that the defen-
dant’s network-mediated contacts were made available within the forum 
state on a geographically unrestricted basis.  As discussed above, defen-
dants who permit their virtual conduct to be available globally without 
using existing limiting techniques are presumed to purposefully avail 
themselves of every jurisdiction in the country.  Thus, the inquiry should 
be whether geographical limiting technology was employed or if the de-
fendant otherwise limited the geographical reach of its virtual conduct in 
some way, not whether Internet activity is “active” or “passive.”  If no 
measures were taken to limit the geographical reach of the virtual activ-
ity, the burden shifts to the defendant to disprove universal purposeful 
availment in the face of the defendant’s deliberate exploitation of a 
global medium without using such limits.  Internet actors should no 
 
 221. See Gutnick v. Dow Jones & Co., (2001) VSC 305, ¶¶ 73, 79 (Supreme Court of Victoria, 
Australia), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSC/2001/305.html (“Dow Jones controls 
access to its material by reason of the imposition of charges, passwords, and the like, and the condi-
tions of supply of material on the Internet.  It can, if it chooses to do so, restrict the dissemination of its 
publication of Barrons on the Internet in a number of respects. . . . I conclude that the State of Victoria 
has jurisdiction to entertain this proceeding.”); Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of 
original jurisdiction] Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, available at http://www.cdt.org/speech/international/ 
001120yahoofrance.pdf (asserting jurisdiction over Yahoo! for failing to employ geographical identifi-
cation techniques in order to prevent their Web site—which permitted visitors to purchase outlawed 
Nazi memorabilia—from being viewable in France). 
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longer be permitted to deny the global reach of their virtual conduct 
while simultaneously embracing the very benefits that the global ubiquity 
of the Internet affords them.  However, when Internet actors employ 
methods aimed at limiting the reach of their virtual activity to avoid a 
given state, direction of activity into that state would not be presumed. 
When the defendant is successful in rebutting the presumption of 
purposeful availment, the plaintiff then must establish through other evi-
dence that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the forum jurisdic-
tion.  This showing would be difficult to make once the defendant has 
proven the use of techniques that effectively prevent or limit the avail-
ability of the defendant’s virtual conduct within the forum.  However, 
evidence that such measures were wholly inadequate, or evidence show-
ing extensive in-forum usage or viewing of the Web site or other virtual 
activity would tend to cast doubt upon the effectiveness of the defen-
dant’s efforts to limit geographically the reach of its virtual conduct. 
The Supreme Court has embraced such a burden-shifting approach 
in other contexts.  For example, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,222 
an employment discrimination case, the Supreme Court articulated a 
burden-shifting approach whereby the plaintiff is required to make a 
prima facie case of racial discrimination, at which point the burden shifts 
to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
the challenged action.223  If the defendant discharges this burden, the bur-
den shifts back to the plaintiff to establish that the articulated reason is a 
pretext for an unlawful, discriminatory reason.224  More recently, in Ce-
lotex Corp. v. Catrett225 the Supreme Court set forth a burden shifting ap-
proach in the context of motions for summary judgment under Rule 56 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.226  The Court wrote that once the 
moving party simply identifies “those portions of the pleadings” and 
other parts of the record that “demonstrate the absence of a genuine is-
sue of material fact,” the nonmoving party must then “go beyond the 
pleadings” to “designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine is-
sue for trial.”227  Given this familiarity with burden shifting approaches, 
courts should be able to apply the proposed approach to Internet juris-
diction cases. 
The second prong of the proposed test simply embodies the arising-
out-of requirement of traditional specific personal jurisdiction analysis.228  
This requirement is critical in preventing the universal jurisdiction feared 
 
 222. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 223. See id. at 802–03. 
 224. See id. at 804. 
 225. 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
 226. Id. at 323–24 (interpreting FED. R. CIV. P. 56). 
 227. Id. 
 228. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (indicating that specific juris-
diction requires that “litigation results from alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or relate to’ those activi-
ties” (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984))). 
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by the courts.  Only those states where the Internet activity gives rise to a 
claim would potentially be permitted to exercise jurisdiction under this 
approach.  Thus, even though the virtual conduct would presumptively 
be directed at every state in the nation, such conduct will rarely create 
causes of action in every state as well.  Further, the limitation that the 
cause of action be cognizable within the state’s courts—borrowed from 
the ALS Scan test—ensures that the case will involve vindication of 
rights protected by the forum state, providing the state with a greater in-
terest in adjudicating the dispute than it otherwise might have. 
Finally, requiring that the assertion of jurisdiction be constitution-
ally reasonable comports with traditional analysis,229 assuring that it will 
not be asserted where it is unduly burdensome or where the controversy 
is insufficiently connected with the forum state’s interests.  Indeed, the 
reasonableness requirement directly addresses courts’ concerns over uni-
versal jurisdiction.230  When Internet-based contacts give rise to a cause 
of action in the forum, unreasonable or outrageous assertions of jurisdic-
tion need not be permitted.231  Courts can articulate reasons, within the 
constitutional reasonableness framework, why jurisdiction would be in-
appropriate in a given case.  What is important here is that courts not 
simply deny jurisdiction by unduly altering traditional principles to pre-
vent Internet contacts from serving as minimum contacts.  Rather, they 
should base their rejection of jurisdiction on the failure of the facts to 
satisfy established requirements such as the requirement that jurisdiction 
be constitutionally reasonable. 
C. Virtues and Vices of the Proposed Approach 
1. Advantages 
The proposed approach is superior in many respects to the Zippo-
based approaches prevalent among the circuits.  First and foremost, it is 
rooted in traditional jurisdictional analysis rather than an adaptation of 
the problematic Zippo standard.  Such a foundation is important most 
notably because traditional doctrine should govern all evaluations of per-
sonal jurisdiction unless and until the Supreme Court alters those princi-
 
 229. See id., 471 U.S. at 476–77 (requiring consideration of “reasonableness” factors once it has 
been shown that defendant purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum state). 
 230. One commentator has suggested that the court should place more emphasis on the reason-
ableness prong in the Internet context.  See Christopher M. Kindel, When Digital Contacts Equal 
Minimum Contacts: How Fourth Circuit Courts Should Assess Personal Jurisdiction In Trademark 
Disputes over Internet Domain Names, 78 N.C. L. REV. 2105, 2140–41 (2000) (“The failure to consider 
fully whether or not a finding of jurisdiction would comport with ‘traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice’ is a grave mistake.  In trademark disputes over Internet domain names, courts 
should place even more emphasis on the reasonableness prong of the due process analysis than they 
do in non-Internet-related suits.” (quoting Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945))). 
 231. See Stravitz, supra note 126, at 940 (suggesting that the Burger King analysis focuses on rea-
sonableness and concluding that “[s]hifting emphasis to the second-branch convenience factors will 
allow jurisdiction to be asserted unless the chosen forum is fundamentally unfair”). 
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ples.  Traditional principles should not be altered—at least not by lower 
courts—in the face of technological advances absent a showing that they 
no longer can be applied under the new circumstances.  Grounding in 
traditional principles would also make it less likely that defendants with 
network-mediated contacts will be treated differently than those defen-
dants whose contacts are not mediated through cyberspace.  When a con-
sistent foundation exists for both Internet and non-Internet cases, Inter-
net actors will not be subjected to either a more stringent or a more 
lenient standard simply because of the medium through which their con-
nection with the forum is established. 
A second advantage of the proposed approach, which derives from 
its adherence to traditional principles, is that it would avoid the inevita-
ble obsolescence problem that will befall Internet-specific tests not 
rooted in traditional analysis.232  The Zippo test and its variants are re-
sponses to the Internet, and Web sites in particular.233  Indeed, it is spe-
cific attributes of the Internet and Web sites that have led the courts to 
alter and adapt an approach for those media.234  But as one commentator 
has noted, such a technologically specific approach “do[es] not provide 
sufficient intellectual flexibility for use with the next generation of Net-
work Communications.”235  The proposed approach, by abandoning any 
consideration of the degree of “passivity” that characterizes the Internet 
activity at issue, is not limited to this technology-specific concern.  
Rather, it focuses on traditionally considered issues not tied to certain 
technology.  This traditional focus grounds the proposed approach in 
principles that have proven to be flexible and, thus, renders the approach 
capable of accommodating future technological changes. 
Third, the approach is honest about the implications of Internet ac-
tivity, eschewing any effort to limit assertions of jurisdiction based on 
Internet contacts beyond what a traditional analysis would suggest.  The 
result is that Internet actors are no longer given unwarranted protection 
from the reality of their unrestricted Internet activity—that it is directed 
into every jurisdiction in the country—and instead incur only the burdens 
that should accompany the benefits of operating on the Internet.  In ef-
fect, the Zippo-based tests have created somewhat of an exception for 
those whose contacts with the forum are mediated through the Internet.  
That is, the courts have taken what would otherwise be deemed to be 
purposeful availment—for example, the publication of information 
within a jurisdiction that gives rise to a cause of action—and deemed it 
not to be so, through the presumption of aimlessness, simply because 
 
 232. See Geist, supra note 16 at 1359 (“In the context of Internet jurisdiction, using indicia that 
reflect the current state of the Internet and Internet technologies is a risky proposition since those in-
dicia risk irrelevancy when the technology changes.”). 
 233. See Matwyshyn, supra note 16, at 512 (“The courts have crafted a jurisdictional standard 
based on websites, a particular manifestation of Network Communications.”). 
 234. E.g., ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 235. Matwyshyn, supra note 16, at 509. 
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publication occurs other places as well.236  Such an exception is hardly 
warranted and unduly protects Internet actors from answering for their 
conduct in jurisdictions where the use of other media—such as conven-
tional publishing or broadcasting—would render them accountable.  The 
proposed approach eliminates this unfair advantage by affirming, rather 
than denying, the forum presence of a Web site by virtue of its availabil-
ity there, making it just as “present” as a conventional publication would 
be. 
Finally, the proposed formulation removes language that permits 
courts to deny jurisdiction in circumstances when it would be acceptable 
under Calder’s “effects” test.  By importing into the analysis of Internet 
contacts the requirement that a defendant be separately connected with a 
state, apart from the connection engendered by a defendant’s commis-
sion of a tortious act against a forum resident, courts have replicated 
their limited view of Calder in the Internet context.  Such a requirement 
has enabled courts to prevent assertions of jurisdiction against the very 
type of defendants—intentional tortfeasors—that Calder sought to reach.  
This happens because the prevailing approaches negate the validity of 
the connection that the tortious conduct itself establishes with the state 
and require that the substance of the virtual vehicle carrying the tortious 
conduct—typically a Web site—be intended for consumption within the 
forum.  The proposed approach eliminates this additional requirement, 
satisfied—as was the Calder Court—with a showing that intentional 
wrongdoing was directed at a forum resident. 
2. Disadvantages 
The proposed approach also has disadvantages.  Being amenable to 
jurisdiction wherever one’s virtual conduct gives rise to a cause of ac-
tion—provided jurisdiction is reasonable—exposes Internet actors to li-
ability under the laws of any jurisdiction where their Web site can be 
viewed or their Internet activity is being transmitted.  This would subject 
Internet actors to a wide array of potentially conflicting legal obliga-
tions,237 and the costs of seeking to comply with the laws of every jurisdic-
tion are likely prohibitive.238  Such high costs, thus, could deter businesses 
 
 236. See ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 712. 
 237. See, e.g., Nguyen, supra note 209, at 525 (“A result is that many laws, some of them in con-
flict with one another, may apply to a defendant’s Internet activities.”). 
 238. See Matwyshyn, supra note 16, at 508 n.78 (“[A]ssuming that an entrepreneur wanted to 
comply with the law of every jurisdiction where the website was viewable, the legal costs of ascertain-
ing what the law required in each jurisdiction would prove prohibitive.”); ICC Policy Statement, supra 
note 144 (“Compliance with the laws of many different countries would impose tremendous costs on 
business and would be prohibitively expensive for SMEs [Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises].”). 
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from engaging in activity on the Internet that would otherwise be benefi-
cial to the economy.239  As one commentator more starkly asserted: 
[T]he prospect of multijurisdictional liability may very well raise the 
price of participation beyond the average citizen’s reach. Much of 
the network’s democratizing influence may be lost if liability deters 
all but the most heavily capitalized entrepreneurs from pursuing all 
but the most highly profitable ventures. The average user simply 
cannot afford the cost of defending multiple suits in multiple juris-
dictions, or of complying with the regulatory requirements of every 
jurisdiction she might electronically touch.240 
Although the proposed approach’s deterrent effect cannot be un-
derestimated, the burden of compliance with the law of the jurisdictions 
within which a business chooses to act is not new.  What is new is the 
ability of businesses to act within every jurisdiction simultaneously.  The 
question is, should this new capability serve as the basis for absolving 
businesses of what has traditionally been a responsibility they must un-
dertake, that is, compliance with local law where it is applicable?  That is 
a policy question; the potential adverse commercial consequences of ap-
plying traditional jurisdictional doctrine to the Internet are policy con-
cerns that the Supreme Court or Congress must address if an alternate 
outcome is desired. 
In any event, it should not be forgotten that many companies have 
already recognized the need to tailor their Web sites for the legal regimes 
in which they will be made available or limit their availability to those lo-
cales in which they are willing to be subjected to jurisdiction.  For exam-
ple, Amazon.com, rather than abandon its global reach and the profit-
able markets that go with such a reach, has decided “to mitigate its 
risk . . . through the creation of country-specific Web sites, such as ama-
zon.co.uk or amazon.de, that service customers in some of its larger in-
ternational markets.  These sites are run from the local jurisdiction and 
are designed to be compliant with local laws.”241  The International 
Chamber of Commerce reports the response of companies to broad ju-
risdictional risks on the international level as follows: 
[M]any companies today simply are not willing to subject them-
selves to the costs of investigation and compliance with a myriad of 
rules in each country, or the risk of sanctions, unenforceable con-
tracts, and adverse publicity in hundreds of countries, states, and 
provinces.  Consequently, as stated above, companies are limiting 
the use of their websites in terms of both products and geography, 
and they engage in e-commerce, if at all, largely through closed sys-
 
 239. See Geist, supra note 16, at 1362 (“This approach would stifle future Internet growth, as 
would-be Internet participants would be forced to weigh the advantages of the Internet with the po-
tential of being subject to legal jurisdiction throughout the world.”). 
 240. Burk, supra note 38, at 60. 
 241. Fears Affecting Global Business Strategy, supra note 144, at 2614. 
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tems with established partners or sales to residents of the territories 
where the companies are already well established.242 
This response by companies highlights another disadvantage of the 
proposed approach:  the goal of liability avoidance may lead many busi-
nesses to employ the geographic mapping technologies discussed 
above,243 which could result in a large number of Web sites, goods, and 
services being unavailable to people beyond certain geographical areas.244  
Such an outcome would balkanize the Internet into more limited geo-
graphically oriented spheres, undermining the very ubiquity that is the 
sine qua non of the medium.245  But the ability of Internet activity to sat-
isfy the purposeful availment requirement of the minimum contacts 
analysis should not be denied simply to achieve certain policy goals.  If 
the promotion of e-commerce and preservation of the omnipresence of 
the Internet are policies worthy of promotion, Congress or the Supreme 
Court must intervene to further these interests.  Otherwise, the tradi-
tional analytical framework should be applied. 
The weighing of these varying interests is a task best suited for the 
political branches.246  However, the balance tips in favor of applying tra-
ditional analysis, via the proposed approach, rather than some adulter-
ated version of a minimum contacts analysis designed to limit the juris-
dictional consequences of Internet conduct.247  The interest of plaintiffs in 
being able to redress wrongs effected through electronic activity that 
reaches into their jurisdiction and the interest of states in providing a fo-
rum for the resolution of such disputes is strong.  These interests should 
 
 242. ICC Policy Statement, supra note 144. 
 243. See supra text accompanying note 136. 
 244. See ICC Policy Statement, supra note 144 (“The negative result of jurisdictional ambiguity in 
e-commerce, or of aggressive insistence on compliance with detailed local rules when dealing across 
borders with local residents, is twofold.  First, many goods and services are held back entirely from the 
global electronic marketplace.  Second, other goods and services are offered only in a limited number 
of jurisdictions, and consumers in other places are denied access to competitive products and prices 
through the online marketplace.”). 
 245. See Geist, supra note 16, at 1405 (describing such a future as a “bordered Internet” that 
could result in “less consumer choice since many sellers may stop selling to consumers in certain juris-
dictions where risk analysis suggests that the benefits are not worth the potential legal risks”). 
 246. This term generally refers to the legislative and executive branches, although some might 
include the Supreme Court among these cohorts, given that the institution is clearly not apolitical. 
 247. One court explicitly undertook analysis of the competing policy issues involved in a decision 
to assert jurisdiction based on network-mediated contacts as follows: 
On the one hand, it [] troubles me to force corporations that do business over the Internet, pre-
cisely because it is cost-effective, to now factor in the potential costs of defending against litiga-
tion in each and every state; anticipating these costs could make the maintenance of a Web-based 
business more expensive.  On the other hand, it is also troublesome to allow those who conduct 
business on the Web to insulate themselves against jurisdiction in every state, except in the state 
(if any) where they are physically located. 
Massachusetts has an interest in protecting its citizens from confusion, and its corporations 
from trademark infringement.  It has a further interest in alerting its citizens who maintain Web-
sites for business purposes that there is a chance that they may be haled into court in any state 
where their Web-site potentially causes harm or transacts business.  On the whole, this factor 
leans toward this Court’s assertion of jurisdiction over ATI. 
Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 471 (D. Mass. 1997). 
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not be sacrificed simply because of the potential cost to businesses248 or 
to promote the growth of e-commerce and preserve the Internet as a 
medium of global communication.  Furthering such interests is not the 
purpose of the constitutional law of personal jurisdiction.  Rather, the in-
terests of plaintiffs and states should only be trumped by defendants’ due 
process concerns; when Internet actors would be subjected to defending 
themselves in an unconstitutionally burdensome forum,249 the interests of 
plaintiffs and states may more appropriately be made to yield.  Further, it 
is not entirely clear that the gloom and doom forecasts of the business 
community should be heeded.  Although businesses seek to avoid ex-
panded regulation and potential liability as a matter of course, they often 
have been more than capable of adapting to challenging legal environ-
ments without sacrificing profitability.  Commercial enterprises have 
proven to be quite diligent with their efforts to expand markets and seek 
new profits, and they are not likely to allow jurisdictional rules to get in 
their way. 
D. Applying the Proposed Approach to Paradigm Cases 
Experience has taught us that disputes arising out of network-
mediated contacts can be distilled into several paradigm cases that repre-
sent the range of possible circumstances out of which actionable claims 
can arise.  These paradigm cases warrant analysis using the proposed ap-
proach to illustrate its application.  The paradigm cases can be divided 
into three main categories:  (1) claims arising from commercial Web sites; 
(2) claims arising from noncommercial Web sites; and (3) claims arising 
from non-Web Internet activity. 
1. Commercial Web Sites 
The first group of disputes arises from commercial Web sites, with 
the first paradigm case being the commercial/contract dispute.  The de-
fendants have used the Internet to distribute a Web site to potential con-
sumers in the hope that they will discover their product or service250 and 
ultimately make a purchase, either online or through more conventional 
channels.251  When purchases are made online, the defendant is engaging 
 
 248. As one commentator aptly stated the point, “Granted, it is somewhat troubling to hold [enti-
ties that solicit business through a website] responsible for the potential cost of defending litigation in 
any forum where transaction of business may be the ultimate objective.  However, considering the 
minimal effort required to establish a Web site and the potential results of Web activities, it is even 
more troublesome to allow such entities to reap the benefits of conducting business on the Web while 
avoiding jurisdiction in any state except where they are physically located.”  Christine E. Mayewski, 
Note, The Presence of a Web Site as a Constitutionally Permissible Basis for Personal Jurisdiction, 73 
IND. L.J. 297, 327 (1997). 
 249. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478 (1985). 
 250. Services as diverse as financial services, email service, or the provision of gambling opportu-
nities are included here. 
 251. See, e.g., Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 452 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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in electronic or e-commerce.252  When the purchases are made offline the 
defendant is engaging in advertising.  The plaintiffs in these cases have 
purchased the product or service and are dissatisfied with what they re-
ceived, perhaps because the product does not function properly or fails 
to perform as advertised, or the services were inadequate or not com-
pleted. 
Whether the Web site is used to engage in e-commerce or advertis-
ing, the proposed approach will ordinarily result in a finding of purpose-
ful availment of the state where the plaintiff is located.  In these cases, 
the defendant will be presumed to have reached out into the plaintiff’s 
state by making its Web site available there (assuming the failure, on the 
part of the defendant, to limit the geographical reach of its Web site into 
the state) and peddling its products or services online to all potential 
consumers without regard to where they reside. 
Once purposeful availment is established, if the Web site has been 
used for e-commerce—meaning it is the medium through which the 
plaintiff’s purchase was made—an ensuing commercial dispute can be 
said to have arisen from the Web site.  In the case of mere advertising, 
however, for the Web site to be charged with having given rise to the 
cause of action in the state where the plaintiff is located, the Web site 
would have to have induced the plaintiff to make a purchase and the 
plaintiff would have to have been able to make that purchase remotely 
either through the mail or by telephone based on contact information 
advertised on the site.  If, on the other hand, the Internet advertisement 
left the plaintiff only with the option of traveling to a physical store to 
purchase the goods, the Web site alone could not be said to have given 
rise to the claim.  Rather, under such circumstances, one would more 
properly look to the connection the defendant has with the forum 
through its bricks and mortar operation where the purchase was con-
summated. 
Whether the assertion of jurisdiction is constitutionally reasonable 
here would depend on the particular circumstances of each case.  How-
ever, because the plaintiff’s interest in a remedy and the state’s interest 
in adjudicating a dispute would ordinarily be compelling, the burden on 
the defendant would have to be great to trump these other interests.253 
The second paradigm case involves the same type of Internet activ-
ity but the resulting harm to the consumer is tortious, rather than contrac-
tual or commercial.  That is, the plaintiff who has either been induced to 
 
 252. “Electronic commerce is the paperless exchange of business information using electronic 
data interchange (EDI), e-mail, electronic bulletin boards, fax transmissions, and electronic funds 
transfer.  It refers to Internet shopping, online stock and bond transactions, the downloading and sell-
ing of ‘soft merchandise’ (software, documents, graphics, music, etc.), and business-to-business trans-
actions.”  BusinessTown.com, The Definition of E-Commerce, http://www.businesstown.com/internet/ 
ecomm-definition.asp (last visited Sept. 23, 2005). 
 253. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478 (indicating that a burden can be so high as to make the de-
fendant’s presentation of its case “gravely difficult”). 
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purchase a good or service through Web-advertising or who has actually 
made the purchase via the Web site has somehow been injured by the 
product received or by its seller.  Examples of these claims include fraud, 
breach of warranty, false/misleading advertising, products liability, and 
the like.  Here, the defendant has purposefully availed itself of the state 
where the plaintiff resides if it has delivered an unrestricted Web site ad-
vertising or selling the good or service in the state.  Further, if the con-
sumer’s purchase was made through or facilitated by that Web site, the 
Web site has given rise to the plaintiff’s claim.  Again, provided that ju-
risdiction is reasonable in the particular circumstances, jurisdiction where 
the plaintiff resides will be appropriate. 
The third paradigm case in the commercial Web site context in-
volves a commercially oriented Web site as described above; however, 
rather than having a plaintiff who is a consumer, the plaintiff is a person 
or entity that has been injured as a collateral consequence of the defen-
dant’s commercial efforts through the Web site.  This can occur, for ex-
ample, when the defendant is alleged to have defamed the plaintiff or in-
fringed the trademark of a competitor254 or a noncompeting business255 in 
the course of advertising/selling its product or services.  The injury can 
occur through information posted within the body of the Web site, in the 
Internet domain address for the site, as is the case in domain name dis-
putes,256 or in the code of a site, which occurs when a Web site uses meta 
tags257 to signal to online search engines to identify the site as the result 
of a search.258  The defendant in such cases may be the owner/operator of 
the Web site, or may simply be someone who has used the Web site to 
post an advertisement or as a medium for selling goods or services, such 
as is the case with online auction sites.  In this group of cases, the rele-
vant forum contact is not the Web site per se; rather, the relevant con-
tacts are the “allegedly tortious[] actions” committed by the defendant.259  
Where the victim of the defamation or trademark infringement resides 
and where the injury occurred are the pertinent questions.  Because the 
defendant has committed this alleged wrong through a Web site that was 
delivered into the plaintiff’s home state and thereby caused damage to 
 
 254. See, e.g., Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996). 
 255. Zippo was this kind of case.  See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 
1121 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
 256. It seems possible that defamation could occur by virtue of the domain address alone if the 
defendant had developed an address that itself constituted a defamatory statement, for example 
“www.John_P_Doe_lies_on_his_tax_returns.com.” 
 257. Meta tags “provide information such as who created the page, how often it is updated, what 
the page is about, and which keywords represent the page’s content.  Many search engines use this 
information when building their indices.”  Webopedia, Meta tag, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/ 
M/meta_tag.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2005). 
 258. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 465–66 (7th Cir. 2000) (af-
firming the grant of a preliminary injunction against the defendant whose Web site source code con-
tained the term “Prozac” as a meta tag because such was considered to be evidence of the defendant’s 
intent to confuse and mislead consumers). 
 259. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984). 
SPENCER.DOC 12/7/2005  2:04:03 PM 
No. 1] JURISDICTION AND THE INTERNET 119 
the plaintiff in that state, the proposed approach would permit the find-
ing that the defendant has purposefully availed itself of the state in which 
the plaintiff resides.  This conclusion is reached without regard to 
whether the Web site has commercially targeted or interacted with any 
residents within the state.  Such contacts are not relevant because it is not 
those commercial contacts that give rise to the claim; rather, it is the “al-
legedly tortious actions” that give rise to the claim, whether those be de-
famatory statements or misuses of protected intellectual property. 
2. Noncommercial Web Sites 
The types of claims that can arise out of noncommercial Web sites 
are similar to those just discussed.  The first paradigm case in the non-
commercial Web site context involves contract, tort, or intellectual prop-
erty claims arising from Web sites that serve as forums for communica-
tion—which would include, for example, chat rooms, newsgroups,260 and 
web logs, which are commonly referred to as “blogs”261—rather than as a 
medium for or instigator of commercial exchange.  Typical of this type of 
case is the defamation claim, where one person posts statements to the 
Web site that defame an individual262 or business263 in some way.  Other 
torts, such as fraud, interference with prospective business advantage, or 
infliction of emotional distress, seem perfectly capable of being commit-
ted in these virtual forums as well.  It is also possible to imagine an intel-
lectual property claim arising in such circumstances, where, for example, 
a user wrongfully discloses protected trade secrets or copyrighted mate-
rial.264  Contract actions could also result here, for example, from the 
breach of a nondisclosure agreement. 
For claims in this group, the proposed approach focuses on the 
statements or conduct alleged to cause harm—rather than the target au-
 
 260. On the other hand, newsgroups exclusively available on USENET are not properly viewed as 
being “websites” on the World Wide Web because USENET is a distinct system from the Web.  Like 
Web sites, newsgroup postings can be distributed throughout the world, and are accessible globally via 
the Internet.  However, unlike most Web sites, access to the postings is generally restricted to sub-
scribers to the group.  See supra note 48 for more information regarding USENET. 
 261. “A weblog (sometimes shortened to blog or written as ‘web log’ or ‘Weblog’) is a Web site of 
personal or non-commercial origin that uses a dated log format that is updated on a daily or very fre-
quent basis with new information about a particular subject or range of subjects.  The information can 
be written by the site owner, gleaned from other Web sites or other sources, or contributed by users.”  
Whatis.com, Weblog, http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/0,,sid9_gci213547,00.html (last visited 
Mar. 24, 2003). 
 262. See, e.g., Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 529 (Minn. 2002) (involving a case of alleged 
defamation over an Internet newsgroup against an individual). 
 263. See, e.g., Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., 297 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1156 (W.D. 
Wis. 2004) (addressing alleged defamation of a business via Internet postings). 
 264. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 
1239 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (alleging copyright infringement and misappropriation of trade secrets based on 
the posting of information to an Internet newsgroup).  A student at Harvard was recently sued by Ap-
ple Computer Inc. for disclosing its trade secrets on his Web site, www.ThinkSecret.com.  See Associ-
ated Press, Teen Sued by Apple in Trade-Secrets Case Gains Legal Help, Jan. 20, 2005, http://www. 
detnews.com/2005/technology/0501/20/technology-64853.htm. 
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dience of the Web site or postings to the site—and identifies the victim of 
that harm and the place where the harm is suffered.  Assuming the harm-
ful posting is accessible in the state where the victim resides and suffers 
harm—which will be the case unless geographical restrictions are em-
ployed265—the defendant who posts the information would be deemed to 
have purposefully availed itself of that state.266  The relatedness require-
ment would also be satisfied because the contacts of interest—tortious or 
infringing actions or conduct that constitutes a contractual breach—
would be the very contacts that give rise to the claim.  Finally, reason-
ableness—as usual—would depend on the circumstances of each particu-
lar case.  It is important to emphasize that the operator of the Web site—
who merely provides the forum in which the harmful statement is 
made—would not be considered to have purposefully availed itself of the 
forum state because the targeting of the posted comment would be the 
“unilateral activity” of a third party (the person posting the comment) 
rather than the deliberate action of the site operator.267 
In the second paradigm case in the noncommercial Web site con-
text, the Web site is merely a source of information that allows visitors to 
view the information but does not permit them to post any information 
themselves.  Web sites maintained by news organizations, such as news-
papers or news-oriented television stations, are included within this 
group as are other informational sites, such as those maintained by gov-
ernmental entities, service organizations such as hospitals, or those dis-
playing visual or written material for entertainment value.  Claims arising 
from such Web sites are similar to those possible through Web sites fa-
cilitating online communication—contract, tort, or intellectual property 
claims268—again with defamation serving as the most likely claim to arise 
in this context.269  However, in this circumstance, the owner/operator of 
the Web site is responsible for the information being posted and would 
be the defendant in cases arising out of these Web sites.270  Applying the 
proposed approach to this group of cases would typically support a find-
ing of personal jurisdiction over the defendants in the state where the al-
leged victim resides, based on the victim’s residency and the availability 
 
 265. Or, if access to the site is restricted to a known group of people, none of whom reside within 
the forum state, then the site should be deemed to be unavailable in the forum state. 
 266. See, e.g., Carlisle v. Sotirin, No. Civ. A. 04-1549, 2005 WL 78938, at *4 (E.D. La. Jan. 11, 
2005) (“[T]he effects of the defamation were aimed at a [forum state] resident and felt within the fo-
rum.  Based on Calder and its progeny, the effects of defendants’ alleged defamation serve as mini-
mum contacts with [the forum] for the purpose of personal jurisdiction.”). 
 267. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
 268. See, e.g., Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(trademark infringement claim arising out of alleged misuse of mark on informational Web site). 
 269. See, e.g., Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002) (involving alleged 
defamation via a newspaper’s Web site). 
 270. Employees of the Web site operators, such as reporters, would also be included among the 
group of potential defendants in this context.  See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 791 (1984) (permitting 
jurisdiction over reporters responsible for defamatory article appearing in a nationally circulated pub-
lication). 
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of the information in the forum, provided the assertion of jurisdiction 
were reasonable.  Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,271 a non-Internet 
case, suggests that at least in the defamation context, jurisdiction could 
also be appropriate in states where the plaintiff does not reside, but the 
defamatory statements are circulated via the Internet.272  In Keeton, the 
Supreme Court stated, “[Hustler Magazine]’s regular circulation of 
magazines in the forum State is sufficient to support an assertion of juris-
diction in a libel action based on the contents of the magazine.”273  The 
Court indicated that the sale of thousands of magazines (15,000) in the 
forum state “cannot by any stretch of the imagination be characterized as 
random, isolated, or fortuitous,” making jurisdiction over claims arising 
out of such contacts clearly consistent with Due Process.274  Broad circu-
lation of defamatory material via the Internet through unrestricted Web 
sites should be treated no differently.  Thus, under the proposed ap-
proach, where defamatory material is directed into a state via the Inter-
net, it harms the plaintiff wherever the material is accessible and gives 
rise to a claim in each of those places.  Jurisdiction in such cases seems to 
be entirely consistent with the Court’s position in Keeton and Calder.275 
In the third paradigm case in the noncommercial Web site context, 
a Web site facilitating cost-free data transfers gives rise to breach of con-
tract, tort, or intellectual property claims.  Web sites offering free soft-
ware downloads are the model here.276  A contract dispute can arise from 
the violation of a terms-of-use agreement by the provider of the soft-
ware.  Torts can result from malfunctions of the software that result in 
harm to one’s computer.  Intellectual property problems can arise out of 
the distribution of protected material through the Web site.  In each of 
these instances, when the defendant makes the free download available 
in the forum state, permits forum residents to access the data, and a fo-
rum resident suffers some harm as a result, the proposed approach would 
support a finding of purposeful availment and relatedness, with reason-
ableness requiring attention to specific facts.277 
 
 271. 465 U.S. 770 (1984). 
 272. Id. at 780. 
 273. Id. at 773–74. 
 274. Id. at 774. 
 275. See, e.g., Carlisle v. Sotirin, No. Civ. A. 04-1549, 2005 WL 78938, at *4 (E.D. La. Jan. 11, 
2005) (“[S]pecific personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in defamation cases may be found 
where the effects of the defamatory statement caused injury.”) (noting Calder, 465 U.S. at 783). 
 276. See www.download.com for an example of a Web site offering visitors access to software 
downloads at no cost. 
 277. Under the proposed approach, which treats unrestricted web publishing as purposeful activ-
ity that presumptively avails itself of all jurisdictions, it would not matter if the download was the re-
sult of the plaintiff visiting a site on his own to seek the file or the result of clicking on a pop-up adver-
tisement pushed onto the plaintiff’s computer.  See Natalya Shmulevich, A Minimum Contacts and 
Fairness Examination of Personal Jurisdiction over Providers of Free Downloads on the Internet, 13 
MEDIA L. & POL’Y 55, 73–84 (Summer 2004), for a discussion of these two scenarios. 
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3. Non-Web Internet Activity 
The final group of paradigm cases involves Internet activity that 
does not take the form of Web site publication or the use of a Web site.  
The first paradigm case in this group is a case where the use of direct 
communications technology results in a contract, tort, or intellectual 
property claim.  Email transmissions and instant messaging most readily 
come to mind here, but online telephony,278 video, and audio technology 
are growing in use as well.  This technology is similar to a telephone or 
fax machine in that it is specific and directed to chosen recipients rather 
than generally broadcast to all persons with Internet access.  Claims aris-
ing out of the use of such technology can be created in the recipients of a 
message, or the claims may be created in nonrecipients, such as is the 
case when defamation is transmitted between two people about a third 
party.  In such cases, defendants harming plaintiffs through this technol-
ogy can only be said to be availing themselves of the places where the in-
tended recipient of the message resides, or, at least in the case of defama-
tion, in the place where the message is circulated by the defendant.279  
Where the intended recipient is also the plaintiff bringing the claim, that 
means the defendant will have satisfied the purposeful availment re-
quirement under the proposed approach by directing the electronic mes-
sage into the plaintiff’s state and inflicting harm there.  However, where 
the plaintiff is not the recipient of the message but rather is a third party, 
the plaintiff will not generally be able to establish purposeful availment 
simply based on the plaintiff’s state of residence, unless the defendant 
circulates the message there.  The defendant sending a direct message via 
the Internet cannot be said to have availed himself of any state other 
than that into which the message was intentionally delivered. 
Another paradigm case involving non-Web use of the Internet 
arises out of the use of software that facilitates peer-to-peer data trans-
mission280 at no cost.  Examples of such software include online file-
sharing programs such as Kazaa281 and Morpheus.282  Users who have 
such programs loaded onto their computers can copy files contained on 
the hard drives of other users via the Internet without having to visit a 
Web site.  Claims that can arise from the use of online file-sharing pro-
grams are principally intellectual property claims by owners of protected 
 
 278. Commonly referred to as Voice over Internet Protocol (Voice over IP or VoIP) or IP te-
lephony, this term refers to technology that sends voice information in digital form through the Inter-
net.  Whatis.com, VoIP, http://searchenterprisevoice.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,290660,sid66_ 
gci214148,00. html (last visited Sept. 22, 2005). 
 279. See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 777. 
 280. “On the Internet, peer-to-peer (referred to as P2P) is a type of transient Internet network 
that allows a group of computer users with the same networking program to connect with each other 
and directly access files from one another’s hard drives.”  Whatis.com, Peer-to-peer, http:// 
searchnetworking.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid7_gci212769,00.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2005). 
 281. This software is available for free download at www.kazaa.com. 
 282. This software is available for free download at www.morpheus.com. 
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material that is being shared among users of these programs.  It is also 
possible to imagine a tort claim where a file copied by the plaintiff ended 
up being corrupted or infected, in which case it could cause damage to 
the plaintiff’s computer.  In these cases, the defendant will be a user of 
the software, most likely the sharer of the data—i.e., the provider of cor-
rupt software or copyright-protected material.  In such a case, purposeful 
availment of any particular jurisdiction based on the Internet activity will 
be difficult to establish under the proposed approach.  Users sharing files 
typically do not receive explicit requests from known parties to copy 
their files; rather, users consent ex ante to making files on their hard 
drives available to whomever comes along and wants to copy them.283  In 
the event that a user begins to copy the files of another user, the sharing 
user may not be aware that the sharing is occurring and may have no way 
of determining the location or identity of the copying user.  Those users 
copying data similarly are ignorant of the location of the persons from 
whom they are gathering data.  Under such circumstances, neither user is 
knowingly engaging in activity that reaches out to a particular state, thus 
no jurisdiction would be available based simply on the online sharing or 
copying activity under the proposed approach.284 
Finally, in the non-Web site context, disputes may arise out of the 
use of online media receivers that allow users to call up certain audio or 
video content for viewing through the use of software contained on the 
user’s computer.  Prominent examples of such technology are Microsoft’s 
Media Player and Real Networks’ Real Player.285  These typically only 
permit users to experience the media content rather than receive and 
copy it as is possible with peer-to-peer file sharing programs.  Intellectual 
property claims might be possible here if the media content is being 
unlawfully transmitted or distributed to users.  In such a case the party 
transmitting the content would only be presumed to have availed itself of 
the jurisdiction where the intellectual property owner is located, not in 
every jurisdiction where the content is sent.  The results for defamation 
cases would be similar:  those transmitting defamatory material would be 
presumed to have purposefully availed themselves primarily of the juris-
diction where the defamed party is located.  Although Keeton suggests 
broader jurisdiction wherever defamatory material is circulated, that 
finding depended upon the Court’s view of the circulation of the defama-
 
 283. See, e.g., Kazaa.com, End User License Agreement, ¶ 4.4, http://www.kazaa.com/us/eula.htm 
(last visited Sept. 22, 2005) (“By saving a file in My Shared Folder, you understand that it will be avail-
able for any other user of Kazaa and compatible programs.  These users may find your files and subse-
quently download them from you.”).  Users are given the option of disabling this feature if they do not 
wish others to have access to their files.  See id. 
 284. Jurisdiction over the provider of the software that permits the sharing would be analyzed as a 
case based on a Web site permitting cost-free data transfers, the third paradigm case in the noncom-
mercial Web site context. 
 285. Media Player software is available for free download at www.microsoft.com; Real Player 
software is available for free download at www.real.com. 
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tory material as not being “random, isolated, or fortuitous.”286  Online 
transmission of defamatory statements via online media receiving soft-
ware is likely to be deemed an isolated contact, thus making the Keeton 
reasoning inapposite. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The approach for evaluating assertions of personal jurisdiction 
based on network-mediated contacts proposed in this article simply 
represents a conclusion that the Zippo framework should be rejected and 
traditional principles should govern the inquiry.  Indeed, the time-tested 
(though admittedly flawed) traditional principles are much more likely to 
operate better in this area than the newly crafted tests developed by 
judges attempting to accommodate a nascent, evolving technology and its 
imagined future.287  The Internet-specific approaches that the circuits 
have announced have been developed based on the notion that an appli-
cation of unaltered traditional principles would result in defendants be-
ing subject to jurisdiction in every state, simply on the basis of the “om-
nipresence” of the Internet and information posted on it.288  It was only a 
desire to limit this perceived outcome that has led courts to stray from 
traditional principles in the Internet context.289  But the fears of universal 
jurisdiction appear to have been overblown.  Traditional analysis pro-
vides several ways to limit the otherwise broad jurisdictional implications 
of acting in a medium that establishes contacts with every jurisdiction.290  
Jurisdiction can only be asserted where the Internet activity serves as the 
basis for the cause of action and where jurisdiction is otherwise constitu-
tionally reasonable.  This will only be the case in a more limited number 
of jurisdictions than a defendant may have purposefully availed itself of 
via the Internet.  Thus, there is less need for a distinct standard as articu-
lated by the courts espousing a Zippo-based approach. 
It may be the case that the jurisdictional consequences of applying 
traditional principles to network-mediated contacts—which are demon-
strably not as broad as many courts fear—are not desired by some (or 
many) courts and commentators.  If such is the case, an alteration of tra-
 
 286. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984). 
 287. One author aptly stated the point as follows: 
[T]he legal system . . . works best retrospectively, not prospectively.  To put it another way, it’s 
easier to learn from history than it is to learn from the future. . . . [T]he law is a tool that is built 
from the real problems we have already faced, not the imagined problems that, in the worst-case 
scenarios of the future, we may face someday. 
This often means that the best thing to do, when technology opens up a new frontier . . ., is 
to sit and wait awhile and see how existing laws and institutions cope with the prob-
lems. . . . [A]lmost always, the time-tested laws and legal principles already in place are more than 
adequate to address the new medium. 
GODWIN, supra note 4, at 299–300. 
 288. ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, 293 F.3d 707, 712 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 289. See id. at 712–13. 
 290. See supra text accompanying notes 119–213. 
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ditional principles to achieve more limited results will be necessary.  That 
is what many circuit courts have in fact done.291  But until the Supreme 
Court alters traditional principles, the handiwork of most courts seems to 
be premature at best, and activist at worst. 
There is a larger issue that needs to be addressed, however.  That is, 
what principles should determine a court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate in 
the twenty-first century?292  Are the principles of International Shoe293 of 
continuing vitality or have the doctrines it spawned become outdated?294  
It is no secret that traditional personal jurisdictional doctrine has its 
shortcomings,295 not the least of which are the reasonableness analysis 
which has become “hopelessly subjective and unpredictable,”296 and the 
fact-specific nature of the minimum contacts approach requiring exten-
sive and unpredictable case-by-case analysis.297  Although Justice Scalia 
once wrote, “There are times when even a bad rule is better than no rule 
at all,” he also stated, “Predictability. . . is a needful characteristic of any 
law worthy of the name.”298  The law of personal jurisdiction continues to 
be just the opposite—unpredictable—notwithstanding the Court’s stated 
goal of articulating standards that would provide “a degree of predict-
ability . . . that allows potential defendants to structure their primary con-
duct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will 
 
 291. E.g., ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 712 (“Applying the traditional due process principles governing a 
State’s jurisdiction over persons outside of the State based on Internet activity requires some adapta-
tion of those principles because the Internet is omnipresent.” (emphasis added)). 
 292. Commentators have begun to address this question.  See, e.g., Katherine C. Sheehan, Predict-
ing the Future: Personal Jurisdiction for the Twenty-First Century, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 385, 438–40 
(1998) (discussing ways that personal jurisdiction doctrine should be realigned to meet the needs of 
the twenty-first century). 
 293. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 294. Justice William Brennan, commenting on the effects of the passage of time on International 
Shoe, remarked, “International Shoe’s jurisdictional principle . . . may be outdated. . . . [B]oth the na-
tionalization of commerce and the ease of transportation and communication have accelerated in the 
generation since 1957.  The model of society on which the International Shoe Court based its opinion is 
no longer accurate.”  World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 307–08 (1980) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
 295. Many commentators have addressed the problems with the International Shoe standard.  See, 
e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Jurisdictional Pragmatism: International Shoe’s Half-Buried Legacy, 28 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 561, 564 (1995) (“The only fair conclusion is that jurisdiction in the United States is a 
mess.”); Jay Conison, What Does Due Process Have to Do With Jurisdiction?, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 
1071, 1076 (1994) (describing the law of personal jurisdiction in the wake of International Shoe as “a 
body of law whose purpose is uncertain, whose rules and standards seem incapable of clarification, and 
whose connection to the Constitution cannot easily be divined”); McMunigal, supra note 41, at 189 
(“Ambiguity and incoherence have plagued the minimum contacts test for the more than five decades 
during which it has served as a cornerstone of the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction doctrine.”). 
 296. Spencer, supra note 176, at 221. 
 297. See, e.g., Douglas D. McFarland, Drop the Shoe: A Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 68 MO. L. 
REV. 753, 767 (2003) (“The irony is that the Court sacrificed predictability for fairness and now the 
result is only what one judge—or a majority of judges—concludes is fair in an individual case.  The 
minimum contacts test certainly does not guarantee ‘fair’ decisions.  Instead, it guarantees that each 
case will turn on what one judge thinks fair.”). 
 298. Justice Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law As a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 
(1989). 
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not render them liable to suit.”299  Just as the rule of Pennoyer v. Neff300 
cracked and ultimately crumbled over time,301 so too may the minimum 
contacts approach of International Shoe suffer a similar fate.  Considera-
tion of this issue, however, is beyond the scope of this article.302 
For now, suffice it to say that any approach that purports to apply 
traditional jurisdictional principles to the Internet will inevitably suffer 
from many of the same flaws that characterize traditional doctrine and its 
concepts.  Thus, when asking what the limits of Internet-based jurisdic-
tion should be, as one commentator aptly put it, “There will be no good 
answer to this question until the rules for personal jurisdiction in the real 
world are reformed to make them both coherent and just.”303  In the 
meantime, defendants whose contacts with a forum are mediated 
through cyberspace deserve to be judged by the same traditional jurisdic-
tional standards used to judge assertions of jurisdiction based on contacts 
made in real space. 
 
 
 299. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
 300. 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877). 
 301. Christopher D. Cameron & Kevin R. Johnson, Death of A Salesman? Forum Shopping and 
Outcome Determination Under International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769, 782 (1995) (describing 
the demise of the Pennoyer regime and explaining that “territoriality proved too inflexible a tool for a 
developing national economy”). 
 302. This issue is taken up in a forthcoming article by the author.  See Spencer, supra note 213. 
 303. Sheehan, supra note 292, at 438. 
